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INTRODUCTION
Virtually every discussion of race and racial justice in this nation now takes place
in the long shadows cast by events like the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson,
Missouri.' As one observer declared after the murder of nine people in a Charleston,
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the University of Nebraska. She earned her J.D. from the University of Nebraska and
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University of Michigan.
I. See, e.g., Michael Eric Dyson, Where Do We Go After Ferguson?,N. Y. TIMES,
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South Carolina church, "America is living through a moment of racial paradox"
within which "Black culture has become... mainstream... [but] the situation of
black America is dire." 2 The Supreme Court, in turn, has been repeatedly criticized
for "often rul[ing] against those most in need of its protection" 3 and, especially in
matters of racial justice, having a "blinkered view" and "naive vision." 4 Its critics
argue that it is a "Court [that] in closely-contested rulings, has weakened or even
wiped out affirmative action's race-conscious policies designed to overcome and
rebalance our history of discrimination in employment and admissions."5
It is then hardly surprising that the Court's decision to once again take up the
contentious issue of affirmative action in college admissions was viewed with alarm
by those who support admissions preferences. 6 As is invariably the case, the Court
did not explain why it agreed to reexamine the admissions regime at the University
of Texas at Austin in what is now styled as Fisher11.7 It simply announced that the
petition for a writ of certiorari had been granted, 8 presumably to undertake the
inquiry suggested by the Question Presented crafted by counsel for Abigail Noel
Fisher: to determine "[w]hether the Fifth Circuit's re-endorsement" of the Texas
policy "can be sustained under this Court's decisions interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9

Nov. 30, 2014, at SRI (discussing "clashing perceptions [that] underscore the physics of

race" within which "[t]he instrument through which one perceives race - one's culture,
one's experiences, one's fears and fantasies - alters in crucial ways what it measures").
2.
Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to Charleston, Anguish About Race Keeps
Building, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2015, at A17.
3.
Editorial, Ten Years of an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2015, at SR8.
4.
Editorial, Racial Equality Loses at the Court, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 2014, at
A22.
5.
Carla Seaquist, Racist Police, Courts, Fraternities:Who Says We Don't Need
Affirmative Action Anymore?, HUFFINGTON POST (March 25, 2015, 12:04 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carla-seaquist/racist-police-courts-fratemities-whosays-we-don't-need-affirmative-action-anymore b 6929038.html.
6.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Race in Admissions, N.Y.
TIMES,

June 30, 2015, at Al (in a "move [that] supporters of race-conscious admissions

programs called baffling and ominous," the Supreme Court "agreed to... take a second
look at the use of race in admission decisions by the University of Texas at Austin").
7.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), reh 'g en banc
denied, 771 F.3d 274, cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 2888 (2015) (Fisher II). The policy at
issue initially came to the Court in Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411
(2013) (Fisher I). It did not reach the merits, remanding the case to the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit so that it could "apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny." Id. at
2415. The case originated in 2008 when Ms. Fisher filed suit. The District Court held
that the policy was constitutional. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587
(W.D. Tex. 2009). That decision that was affirmed, 631 F. 3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011),
rehearing was denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), and it was taken to the Court,
resulting in Fisher I.
8.
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S.Ct. 2888 (2015) ("Petition for a
writ of certiorari... [is] granted."). The Court also noted that "Justice Kagan took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition." Id. Her recusal was due to her prior
involvement in the case during her service as Solicitor General of the United States.
9.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.at Austin, 758 F.3d
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That suggests that diversity will remain a constitutionally permissible goal. But
supporters of affirmative action are at best skeptical. They believe the decision to
take the case reflects a considered strategy by the Court's conservative members to
find a way to end race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.' 0 That
sentiment is understandable given recent events and the manner in which the Court
has approached many of these issues over the past several Terms. It is also incorrect
and short-sighted. The real problem confronting diversity's supporters is not the
potential demise of the Court's holding in Grutter v. Bollinger that this nation's
colleges and universities have "a compelling interest in attaining student body
diversity."'" It lies rather, in what a victory for Texas might portend.
My thoughts on FisherII in this Article will be somewhat unusual. My threshold
assumption is that the Court will use the case to reaffirm Grutterand clarify what is
required when a college or university decides to adopt an affirmative admissions
policy as a means of attaining student body diversity. As I will explain, the decision
to grant review was both logical and necessary. It is actually a welcome opportunity
for the Court to give badly needed guidance to both sides in this debate about how
best to go about implementing those policies. Indeed, I believe that for those who
wish to preserve the diversity victory in Grutter, the best possible outcome will be
to have their implementation feet held to the fire of intense judicial scrutiny in Fisher
II. That said, there are substantial perils in this process given the lackadaisical
manner in which virtually all institutions have approached their actual educational
obligations once they have taken the steps required to admit a diverse group of
students. 12
I will also argue that this new round of litigation offers an important opportunity
for affirmative action's proponents to do two interrelated things. The first is to
recognize, account for, and undertake key obligations imposed by Grutter and
FisherL The second is to seize the opportunities presented in the wake of Fisher I
to strengthen their case for the value of diversity as a matter of educational policy
by focusing our attention on implicit racial bias. The virtues of educational diversity
identified by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her opinion for the Court in Grutter
had solid social science foundations. 13 The evidence cited by the Court at that time
did not, however, account for an important aspect of our national malaise, the
corrosive impact of implicit racial bias and stereotyping. 14 Significant developments

633 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-981) [hereinafter Fisher 11Petition].
10.
See, e.g., Editorial, Why anotherlook at affirmative action?, L.A. TIMES, (July
2, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-affirmative-actiontexas-case-supreme-court-20150630-story.html. (Stating that among the four or more
members of the Court who voted to grant the writ "[s]ome clearly hope that this time
around the court will endorse" the "extreme view that 'a State's use of race in higher
education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the equal protection clause'
of the 14th Amendment.") (quoting Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
11.
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
12.
See infra Part IlI-A, discussing the importance of programming for educational
outcomes and rigorous assessment.
13.
See infra text accompanying notes 20-21.
As I note, see infra text accompanying note 359, the Court did receive a brief
14.
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in this body of knowledge have the potential to bolster the Court's prior
determination that diversity's "benefits are not theoretical but real. 15 This
knowledge can, and should, be part of the dialogue as we reexamine these issues.
Part I of this Article sets the stage for this discussion by identifying what Fisher
II is and is not about. In particular, I argue that supporters of affirmative action
should set aside their fears that the Court will abolish affirmative action in higher
education admissions systems and concentrate instead on what the Court will likely
tell them about how such programs should be implemented. FisherII is a case that
verifies the maxim that "the devil is in the details." In this instance, that demon is
the need for colleges and universities to do with care what the Supreme Court
expected when it decided Grutter: namely, adopt "'means chosen to accomplish
[their] asserted purpose [that are] specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish
6
that purpose.""
Part II connects FisherH to what I believe to be two important lessons posed by
the differences between Grutter and the Court's first take on this issue in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke.1 7 The first is its focus on the reality that the case
for affirmative action and diversity in Grutter turns on the premise that it will
actually generate beneficial educational outcomes. Bakke, on the other hand, simply
took higher educations' embrace of diversity at face value and spoke in vague terms
' 18
of things that were "widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body."
The second is to recognize and account for an important way in which Grutter
expanded the case for diversity. Bakke focused almost exclusively on "[tihe
atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation"' that arises from "a diverse
student body."' 9
Grutter did more, extending the justifications for and
acknowledged benefits of a diverse learning environment beyond the college years
in ways that make its potential benefits all the more compelling.
Part III explores two aspects of the case for diversity. My goal is not to make
that case. Rather, I explore its dimensions and, more importantly, discuss its
implications. In each instance, the focus is on the evidence presented to the Court
suggesting that the benefits of diversity are real. The social science foundations for
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter were important.
They were also limited in two key respects. The first was its reliance on contact
theory, a body of research that emphasizes the impact of "engaging and interacting

discussing implicit bias and the distinction between "'discrimination' [which] describes
unequal treatment [and] 'prejudice' [which] has to do with thoughts and feelings." See
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Association at 5, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516) [hereinafter APA Grutter Brief]. Justice O'Connor did not cite it or discuss
the issues posed.
15.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
16. Id. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
17.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
18. Id. at 312.
19.
Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1967)). See also
id. at 313 (discussing the goal of "select[ing] those students who will contribute most to
the 'robust exchange of ideas"') (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967))).
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with diverse peers." 20 The second was the failure to account for key aspects of how
prejudice and stereotypes actually operate. In particular, the materials cited in
Grutter did not acknowledge implicit bias, the "unwitting, unintentional, and
uncontrollable" impulses that infect "normal, everyday human thought and activity"
of even "the most well-intentioned people." 21 Careful attention to that phenomenon
- and the development of interventions designed to deal with it - has the potential
to go a long way toward explaining the promise of Grutter in an era where "racial
22
discrimination [is pervasive] in a society that favors formal racial equality.
Part IV reexamines all of this in the special and informative contexts provided
by the obligations imposed on this nation's schools and colleges of law by their
primary accrediting agency, the American Bar Association (ABA). Legal education
is one of the very few segments of the higher education community where both the
need for affirmative action and its use are routine. The ABA treats the use of
affirmative action in pursuit of diversity as a duty, not an option, 23 and its current
rules track closely the outcomes-based approach taken by Justice O'Connor in
Grutter.24 There are also aspects of how law schools are structured and operate that
make them especially suitable venues for assessment and documentation. Taken
together, these realities have important consequences and make legal education an
especially apt exemplar of the obligations, challenges, and opportunities that lie
ahead.
I. FISHER II: FICTIONS AND FACTS
Many observers suspect that the Court's decision to hear FisherII does not bode
well for the future of affirmative action in higher education admissions. Their focus
and fear is the prospect that the four most conservative members of the Court - Chief
Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and
Samuel Alito - will use Fisher II as an opportunity to bring Justice Anthony
Kennedy fully into their fold and craft a holding that rejects the use of race as a factor
in the college and university admissions process.
That could prove to be the case. The Court will do what a majority of its members
wishes, and it is abundantly clear that four of its members are adamantly opposed to
the use of race as a factor in the admissions process. Justice Thomas stated in no
uncertain terms in FisherI that "a State's use of race in higher education admissions

20.
Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. at 7, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter AERA Brief]. Justice
O'Connor cited this brief in her opinion. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
21.
Curtis D. Hardin & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Nature of Implicit Prejudice:
Implications for Personal and Public Policy, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF

PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013), at 13, 14 [hereinafter Hardin & Benaji].
22.
Darren Leonard Hutchinson, "Continually Reminded of Their Inferior
Position ": Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality,and Race, 46 WASH. U.J.L. &
POL'Y 23, 28 (2014) [hereinafter Hutchinson].
23.
See infra text accompanying note 399 (discussing the obligations imposed by
ABA accreditation Standard 206, which addresses "Diversity and Inclusion").
24. See infra text accompanying notes 409-10 (discussing the current ABA
accreditation Standard 302, which focuses on "Learning Outcomes").
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decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause." 25 Justice
Scalia repeated there the position he took in Grutter, that "[t]he Constitution
proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided
education is no exception." 26 Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito have
written separately in a case where the constitutionality per se of a college or
university affirmative action policy was the focus. 27 But their views are clear,
captured most memorably in the declaration that "[t]he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. ' 28 Moreover, the
group that hears Fisher II will not include Justice Elena Kagan, a recusal that
significantly reduces the number of reliable pro-affirmative action votes. That
magnifies the importance of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who, as one of the prophets
of possible doom has observed, "has never voted to uphold an affirmative action
program. 29
That said, the issue actually before the Court is not the constitutional propriety
of affirmative action and diversity. Rather, it is the manner in which the University
of Texas has pursued that goal. The Question Presented in Fisher I was carefully
framed. It focuses on whether the manner in which Texas proceeded "can be
sustained under this Court's decisions," 30 not on "whether there is a compelling
interest in diversity," which "Ms. Fisher ha[s] no need to challenge." 31 It also

25.
Fisher1, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
27. Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), where he observed that "racial preferences
may ... do more harm than good." Id. at 1638-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The focus
there was not, however, the constitutionality of admissions preferences, but rather
whether the people of Michigan could make the decisions that state institutions could not
grant preferences on the basis of "race sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." Id. at 1629
(quoting MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26).
28. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007). The two school districts in that case did ask the Court to recognize the
"educational and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning
environment." Id. at 725. The Chief Justice rejected that request in his plurality opinion,
stating that there was no need to resolve it since "the racial classifications employed by
the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social
benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity." Id. at 726.
29.
Liptak, supra note 6. See also Scott Jaschik, Supreme Court will once again
consider affirmative action in college admissions, INSIDE HIGHER ED, (June 30, 2015),

https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/30/supreme-court-will-once-againconsider-affirmative-action-college-admissions (noting that while Justice Kennedy "has
voted with the liberal wing on issues such as same-sex marriage, that is not the case when
it comes to race").
30. Fisher II Petition, supra note 9, at i.
31.
Reply Brief at 7, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014)
(No. 14-981). See also id. at 8 ("A constitutional battle over the validity of a racial
diversity interest may someday be fought."). Counsel for Ms. Fisher open the door
slightly for that result when they argue that "[i]f FisherI permits UT to prevail here, the
Court will need to rethink its endorsement of Grutter's diversity interest given the
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recognizes the fact that the Court had previously reviewed the Texas policy and
Appeals [for the Fifth Circuit] did not apply the correct
determined that "the Court of
32
standard of strict scrutiny."
Writing for the Court in Fisher I, Justice Kennedy stated "we take [Bakke and
Grutter] as given for the purposes of deciding this case." 33 That is, it remained the
rule that colleges and universities could "consider[] racial minority status as a
positive or favorable factor in [their] admissions process, with the goal of achieving
the educational benefits of a more diverse student body." 34 He emphasized,
however, that the rigors of strict scrutiny applied and concluded that the lower court
had been unduly deferential in its assessment of how Texas implemented its
constitutionally protected decision to make the pursuit of diversity part of its
institutional mission. 35 The University, he stressed, "must prove that the means
chosen.., to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal.",36 That is, there
must be a "judicial determination that the admissions process meets strict scrutiny
in implementation." 37 The current appeal tracks that history. It focuses exclusively
and narrowly on "the use of racial preferences in admissions decisions where, as
here, they are neither narrowly tailored nor necessary to meet a compelling,
otherwise unsatisfied, educational interest." 38 That is, Ms. Fisher and her legal team
accept that diversity is a compelling interest and are concerned only with the manner
in which the University of Texas is trying to meet what it39claims is an unmet goal,
the need to enroll "a 'critical mass' of minority students."
There are then only two questions actually before the Court in FisherII: whether
the particular approach adopted by Texas in the wake of Grutter is "narrowly
tailored" and whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied that standard on
remand. That technical reality has provided scant comfort for affirmative action's
champions, who suspect that something more is afoot.40 But it is worth recalling
diminished force of 'stare decisis when fundamental points of doctrine are at stake."'
Fisher II Petition, supra note 9, at 30 (quoting Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 792
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
32. Fisher1, 133 S. Ct. at 2415.
33.
Id. at 2417.
Id.
34.
35.
See id. at 2419 (stressing that "a university's 'educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer"' (quoting
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)).
36. Id. at 2420.
37. Id. at 2419-20.
38. Fisher I1Petition, supra note 9, at 2.
39. Fisher1, 133 S. Ct. at 2416. The assumption informing "critical mass" is that
it is a positive good, given that "meaningful numbers" and/or "meaningful
representation" means that "underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or
like spokespersons for their race." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. As I note infra at text
accompanying notes 73-74, there may be a downside to critical mass that must be taken
into account.
40.
See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 6 (musing about the "consequences... if the
court... did away with racial preferences in higher education"); Tamar Lewin &
Richard PNrez-Peia, Colleges Brace for Uncertainty as Court Reviews Race in
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2015, at A14 (noting that the "decision to reconsider"
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that many of the same observers treated Fisher I as a case where "the future of
'
affirmative action in higher education [is] hanging in the balance."41
They made
those claims even though the attorneys for Ms. Fisher denied- multiple times - that
they were challenging the core holding in Grutter.42 Those observors were wrong
then and, I believe, are likely wrong again.
That does not mean that those who favor admissions preferences can rest easy.
Indeed, the fact that FisherH will focus on implementation is arguably an even more
dire reality than the one envisioned by those who fear that affirmative action's days
are numbered. I say that for many of the reasons that led me to previously
characterize Grutter as "Bakke with Teeth. '43 Specifically, Grutterwas a holding
that imposed substantial obligations on institutions that opt to embrace diversity as
part of their institutional mission and then employ race-conscious criteria as part of
the admissions process. In particular, as I will discuss in greater detail in Part II-A,
Grutter tied its approval of affirmative action in pursuit of diversity to a need to
design and implement systems that will actually produce documented educational
outcomes.
The stakes are magnified by a closely related doctrinal reality: the degree of
scrutiny that courts must utilize when assessing whether a given college or university
has made its case. The Grutter Court emphasized that all of the rigors traditionally
associated with strict judicial scrutiny applied: "Even in the limited circumstance
when drawing racial distinctions is permissible to further a compelling state interest,
government is still 'constrained in how it may pursue that end: [T]he means chosen
to accomplish the [government's] asserted purpose must be specifically and
narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose."'4 4 Justice O'Connor went to elaborate
lengths to describe "the contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry ' 45 and list "the

the case "has universities around the country fearing that they will be forced to abandon
what remains of race-based admission preferences").
41.
Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as Factorat Universities,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2012, at Al.
42. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 26, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.
Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (expressly recognizing the Court's determination in
Grutter "that universities have 'a compelling interest in obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body"' (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343));
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(No. 11-345) (characterizing "defen[ses of] racial diversity in higher education as a
compelling interest" as "tilt[ing] at self-created windmills" and stressing that "Petitioner
has not contested the [core] holding of Grutter"); Transcript of Oral Argument at 8,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Fisher
I Transcript] (pressed by Justice Stephen Breyer, Bert W. Rein, representing Ms. Fisher,
stressed that "we have said, very carefully, we were not trying to change the Court's
disposition of the issue in Grutter"). The Court subsequently expressly acknowledged
that "the parties here do not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter's holding."
FisherI, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
43.
Ann M. Killenbeck, Bakke, with Teeth?: The Implications of Grutter v.
Bollinger in an Outcomes-Based World, 36 J.C. & U.L. 1 (2009).
44. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
45.
Id.
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hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. ' 46 That stood in sharp contrast to Bakke,
where the narrow tailoring analysis began and ended with a discussion of the flaws
in a two-track admissions process 47 and of a "quota" system that "tells applicants
they are totally excluded from a specific
who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that
' 8
percentage of seats in an entering class. 4
Grutterand FisherI are much more demanding. An institution that decides that
diversity is "integral to its mission '' 49 and wishes "to use race to achieve the
educational benefits of diversity '50 is not entitled to simply demonstrate that these
decisions were made "'in good faith."' 51 Rather, that college or university must
prove that its affirmative admissions scheme "was not a quota, was sufficiently
flexible, was limited in time, and followed 'serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives."' 52 Emphasizing the need for "giving close
analysis to the evidence of how the process works in practice," 53 the FisherI Court
sent the case back to "the Court of Appeals [so that it could] assess whether the
University has offered sufficient evidence that would prove that its admissions
54
program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.
On remand, a majority of the panel hearing the cases decided that the University
had met its burden. Writing for himself and Judge Carolyn Dineen King, Judge
Patrick E. Higginbotham stated that Texas - an elite, flagship institution55 - had
justified "its necessary use of race in a holistic process and the want of workable
alternatives that would not require even greater use of race."5 6 That phrasing was
telling. It was calculated to track two of the lines set by the Court in Grutter. The
first is the requirement that the admissions evaluation process be "holistic," that is
"highly individualized.., giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant
might contribute to a diverse educational environment" and does not make "an

46. Id. at 334.
47. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-77 (documenting the different processes and
standards).
48. Id. at 319.
49. Fisher!, 133 S.Ct. at 2419.
Id. at 2420.
50.
Id. (quoting Fisher,631 F.3d at 236).
51.
Id. at 2421 (quoting Grutter,539 U.S. at 339).
52.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting
that diversity is "especially important at UT because [of] its 'mission and.., flagship
role"') (quoting Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in
Admissions (June, 2004)). The mission in question, as embodied in the "Compact with
Texans" required by state law - is to provide "superior and comprehensive educational
opportunities" and to "contribute to the advancement of society." Its core values include:
"Leadership";"Individual Opportunity - Many options, diverse people and ideas, and
one University"; and "Responsibility- To serve as a catalyst for positive change in Texas
and beyond." Brief for Respondents at 5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2241 (2013) (No. 11-345) (quoting U[niversity of] T[exas], Compact with Texans)
[hereinafter UT Fisher I Brief].
Fisher,758 F.3d at 660.
56.
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applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application." 57 The
second is that the institution give "serious, good faith consideration of workable
race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks." 58 That
59
"does not require [the] exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative."
60
But it does mandate "sufficient consideration" of those that are "workable."
The panel majority believed that Texas had met its burden. A key element in
their analysis was their take on the Top Ten Percent Plan, which "guarantees Texas
residents graduating in the top ten percent of their high school class admission to
any public university in Texas." 61 That legislative mandate was adopted in the wake
of Hopwood v. Texas,62 which held that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was not
controlling and that "any consideration of race or ethnicity ...for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. '63 The Ten Percent Plan was a calculated attempt to increase minority
enrollment, reflecting as it does "a fundamental weakness in the Texas secondary
education system," the "de facto segregation of schools in Texas." 64 That
"mechanical admissions program" 65 had the advantage of "increas[ing the number
of] minorities in the [admissions] mix [but] ignore[d] contributions to diversity
66
beyond race."
Allowing the consideration of race in a supplemental holistic review, the majority
67
concluded, allowed Texas "to look beyond class rank and focus upon individuals."
As a result, Texas could "reach [and admit] a pool of minority and non-minority
students with records of personal achievement, higher average test scores, or other
unique skills." 68 Characterizing the Texas system as a "unique creature, '69 the
majority concluded it was narrowly tailored within the parameters imposed by the
Supreme Court in both Grutterand FisherL
Judge Emilio M. Garza disagreed. In particular, he took issue with what he
believed was "the majority's failure to make a meaningful inquiry into the nature of

57. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
58.
Id. at 339.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 340.
61.
Fisher,758 F.3d at 645.
62.
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), reh 'gdenied, 84 F.3d 720, cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996).
Id. at 944.
63.
64. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 650. At least one of the individuals involved in crafting
the Ten Percent Plan disagrees, maintaining that the goal, and result, was "to plot a
completely race-neutral response." Michael L. Olivas, The Burden of Persuasion:
Affirmative Action, Legacies, andReconstructingHistory(Book Review), 40 J.C. & U.L.
381, 392 (2014).
65.
Fisher,758 F.3d at 645.
66. Id. at 651.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 653.
69.
Id. at 659.
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Judge Garza stressed that "[hiere, the University has framed its
goal as obtaining a 'critical mass' of campus diversity. '71 The majority
characterized "critical mass" as "the tipping point of diversity," the "minimum
threshold at which minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for
their race." 72 But, as was the case when FisherIwas argued, 73 Judge Garza believed
that the University had not provided a constitutionally appropriate definition of what
that term meant. 74 Judge Garza rejected the University's approach. He emphasized
that "[u]nder the rigors of strict scrutiny, the judiciary must 'verify that it is
a university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of
necessary for
75
diversity."
In particular, Judge Garza criticized two aspects of the University's ambiguous
position about what constituted a critical mass. First, given the Gruttermandate that
an affirmative admissions scheme "must be limited in time,"7 6 he argued that "the
University explains only that it will 'cease its consideration of race when it
determines ...that the educational benefits of diversity can be achieved.., through
a race-neutral policy."' 7 7 This variation on the "I know it when I see it"'78 trope was
unacceptable given the judiciary's obligation to "'verify" that the admissions
program is "'necessary.' 79 "It is not possible to perform this function," Judge Garza
80
argued, "when the University's objective is unknown, unmeasurable, or unclear."
Judge Garza also took issue with the University's argument that the supplemental
admissions policy would "promot[e] the quality of minority enrollment - in short,
diversity within diversity."'s The University, he stressed, "has not shown that
qualitative diversity is absent among the minority students admitted under the raceneutral Top Ten Percent Law" because it "does not evaluate the diversity present in

70. Id. at 667 (Garza, J., dissenting).
71.
Id. at 666.
72. Id. at 656.
73.
For example, during oral argument the Chief Justice asked "[w]hat is that
number... [w]hat is the critical mass ...you are working toward" and counsel for Texas
responded "[y]our Honor, we don't have one." Fisher I Transcript, supra note 42, at 39.
See also id. at 46 ("The compelling interest you identify is attaining a critical mass of
minority students... but you won't tell me what the critical mass is.").
74. See, e.g., id. at 667 (recognizing that "critical mass does not require a precise
numerical decision" but criticizing Texas for "fail[ing] to objectively articulate its goal").
75. Fisher,758 F.2d at 667 (Garza, J., dissenting) (quoting Fisher1, 133 S.Ct. at
2420)).
76.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 342.
77. Fisher,758 F.3d at 667 (Garza, J., dissenting).
78. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The
focus here was on pornography and obscenity and, in Justice Stewart's words, a
"court... faced with the task of trying to define what may be indefinable," id., an
observation that may ultimately prove to be telling given the myriad problems posed by
the concept of "critical mass."
79. Fisher,758 F.3d. at 667. (quoting Fisher1, 133 S.Ct. at 2420).
80. Id.
81.
Id. at 669.
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82
this group before deploying racial classifications to fill the remaining seats."
Tellingly - for reasons I will explain in Part II-A - Judge Garza tied that missing
evaluation dimension to educational outcomes identified by Justice O'Connor in
Grutter:"whether the requisite 'change agents' are among [the group admitted], and
whether these83admittees are able, collectively or individually, to combat pernicious
stereotypes."
The focus in Fisher II will accordingly be on whether Texas can convince a
majority of the Court that it needed to adopt what it characterizes as a very limited
consideration of race in an attempt "to admit students who are more likely, because
of their background, qualifications, and experiences, to enrich the educational
experience for all students at [the] U[niversity of] T[exas]. ' '84 Was the addition of a
holistic review within which race is considered actually necessary? Were
appropriate alternatives considered? In particular, just what does Texas mean by a
"critical mass"?
Lurking within each of these questions is the jurisprudential elephant in the room.
The goal of the Texas program is an "enriched educational experience for all
students," which requires a "critical mass" of minority students. Tellingly, and
tracking Grutter,the university's attempts to explain its conception of critical mass
focus on the end point: "[Texas] explains only that its 'concept of critical mass is
defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce."' 85 That is, the proper focus "is a university's own first-hand assessment
of the educational benefits flowing from student body diversity at a given point in
time." 86 Those assessments, at least to date, have "looked to several data points...
including hard data on minority admissions, enrollment, racial isolation in
classrooms at UT, and reports of racial hostility on campus at UT, as well as direct
feedback from students and faculty. 87
I believe that that type of information can be helpful, but it is not dispositive. It
allows one to sketch a static picture of the demographics of a college or university
at a "given point in time." But it most assuredly does not reflect, at least in any
meaningful way, actual educational outcomes that can be attributed to the presence,
or absence, of "student body diversity [that] promotes learning. '88 And that, I
believe, was ultimately what Grutterboth contemplates and requires.

82. Id.
83.
Id. See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 ("the Law School's admissions policy
promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes, and
'enables [students] to better understand persons of different races") (quoting Grutter v.
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
84. Brief in Opposition at 24, Fisher I1 (No. 14-981) [hereinafter Brief in
Opposition].
Fisher,758 F.3d at 667 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
85.
86. UT Fisher I Brief, supra note 55, at 41.
87.
Brief in Opposition, supra note 84, at 24-25.
88. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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II. BAKKE To GRUTTER
There is a strong temptation to treat Grutter as a decision that simply revisited
and reaffirmed Bakke. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court did indeed state
that she and her colleagues were "endors[ing] Justice Powell's view [in Bakke] that
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race
in university admissions." 89 In that limited respect, it is correct to treat her opinion
as an "unapologetic embrace" of Bakke.9" The manner in which she wrote was
nevertheless distinctive for two telling reasons that have significant implications for
Fisher II: her emphasis on the need for actual educational outcomes, and the
implications of her focus on the need to "'better prepare[] students for an
workforce and society, and better prepare[] them as
increasingly diverse
91
professionals."'

A. Not Theoretical But Real: The Importance of Outcomes
The first significant difference between Bakke and Grutter is one I have already
briefly noted: Grutter is Bakke with teeth. In particular, the GrutterCourt's embrace
of diversity as a compelling educational interest reflected its belief that there was
"detailed evidentiary 92support for [the] claim that diversity had real, demonstrable,
and positive effects."
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke treated the value of diversity largely as a matter
of faith. His controlling opinion was predicated on "the assumption that diversity is
a compelling interest because certain institutions thought it was a good idea" and
accepted the argument that "minority students might bring ... an unspecified
'something"' to such institutions. 93 That made Bakke an exercise in intuition.
Various elite colleges and universities and their leaders spoke eloquently about an
"atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation' - so essential to the quality
of higher education - [that] is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student
Justice Powell was willing to simply accept these beliefs and
body." 94
representations. That does not make them wrong. It does make the principle
articulated in Bakke subject to the telling criticism that "race may be taken into
no perceptible difference, and
account in university admissions, so long as it makes
95
nothing is done in an un-Harvard-like manner.'

Id. at 325.
89.
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 2003 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 16.
90.
91.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting AERA Brief, supra note 20, at 3).
92.
Killenbeck, supra note 43, at 30.
Id. at 36.
93.
94.
Bakke, 439 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,263
(1957)). The two main sources for Justice Powell were a brief article by the then
President of Princeton University, see id. at 312 n. 48 (quoting William G. Bowen,
Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY at 7, 9 (Sep. 26,
1977) [hereinafter Bowen, Admissions], and the Harvard College admissions statement.
See id. at 321-24 (Appendix, Harvard College Admissions Program).
95.
Daniel G. Maguire, The Triumph of Unequal Justice, 95 THE CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 882, 882 (1978). For perspectives on whether the use of the Harvard model
was wise, see Marcia G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity Rationale in University
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Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter had echoes of this approach. She noted,
for example, that the "educational judgment that such diversity is essential to [an]
educational mission is one to which we defer." 96 That particular form of deference
must, however, be understood for what it actually was: a statement that an individual
college or university is free to adopt affirmative admissions measure if it wishes to
do so. That is, as Justice Kennedy belatedly recognized in FisherI, "the decision to
pursue 'the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity' ... is, in
substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete,
judicial deference is proper under Grutter."97 The qualification that followed is an
important one. Institutions must provide "a reasoned, principled explanation for the
academic decision... that a diverse student body would serve its educational
98
goals."
Grutterarticulated "a standard within which diversity is accepted as a compelling
interest because the assumptions for which it stands are supported by positive
evidence regarding actual outcomes." 99 Justice O'Connor made it quite clear that a
key factor in her analysis was the recognition of "the educational benefits that flow
from student body diversity."' 00 These were, she emphasized, "not theoretical but
real," 10 1 documented by "expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial"' 1 2
and "bolstered by... amici."10 3 That is, the value of diversity lies in what it actually
accomplishes, not simply in what it promises. It is, at the risk of repetition, a
constitutionally
permissible goal precisely because its benefits are both "real" and
"substantial."'1°4 Indeed, the key future vote of Justice Kennedy on this issue may
well turn on the extent to which colleges and universities can demonstrate exactly
how "racial diversity among students
can further [their] educational task...
10 5
supported by empirical evidence."'
The good news is that this emphasis made the case for diversity something more
than an article of faith. The use of social science evidence by the Supreme Court to
suggest or bolster a holding has been an important device over the years. The
technique originated in Muller v. Oregon,10 6 in which the Court noted "abundant
testimony of the medical fraternity" as part of its determination that there was a
sound policy basis for a state measure limiting the number of hours a woman may

Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University of Michigan Cases, 90 CORNELL
L. Rev. 463, 470-73 (2005).
96. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
97. Fisher!, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
98. Id.
99. Killenbeck, supra note 43, at 36.
100.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. See also id. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stressing "acceptance of
a university's considered judgment that racial diversity among students can further its
educational task, when supported by empirical evidence").
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
104.
105.
Id. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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work. 107 The focus was the "Brandeis Brief," filed by future Justice Louis D.
Brandeis, which consisted of "three pages... devoted to a statement of the
constitutional principles involved and 113 pages ... devoted to the presentation of
by scientific authorities, to show the evil effects of too
facts and statistics, backed
10 8
long hours on women."
Justice Brandeis subsequently described this as a judicial obligation "to
determine, in the light of all the facts which may enrich our knowledge and
10 9
understanding, whether [a given] measure... transcends the bounds of reason."
That tracks Judge Richard Posner observation that in many constitutional cases
"[t]he big problem is not lack of theory, but lack of knowledge - lack of the very
knowledge that academic research.., is best designed to produce."" l0 The
technique is not universally embraced.I1" Thoughtful critics have argued "that social
science evidence provides a weak and relatively unstable foundation for legal
rules."112 I disagree, at least in this instance. Rigorous studies that document actual
educational outcomes provide appropriate foundations for the precise constitutional
questions posed by affirmative admissions policies: is a group classification actually
relevant, given the decisions that must be made and the goals that are sought?' 13Or
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
is the use of the classification "in fact
114
inferiority or simple racial politics"?
Justice O'Connor's use of social science evidence in Grutterprovides a basis for
educators to insist that their belief in and use of admissions preferences is something
more than simple "racial experimentation."11 I The evidence in question may well
prove to be mixed, 1 6 and its embrace or rejection may be influenced by the views
individual Justices bring to the debate. But its presence as part of the dialogue offers

107.
Id. at 421-23.
108.
Edwin S. Corwin, Social Planning Under the Constitution - A Study in
Perspectives, 26 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1, 17 (1932).
109.
Bums Baking Co. v. Bryant, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
110. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3
(1998).
111.
See, e.g., Carl Brent Swisher, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE 158
(1958) (criticizing the use of such materials in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) as "based on neither the history of the [Fourteenth A]mendment nor on precise
textual analysis" but on the "highly evanescent grounds" of "psychological knowledge").
112. Steven L. Willborn, Social Science in the Courts: The View from Michigan, in
SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES,

143, 145 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Social Consciousness].
113.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(characterizing "government action[s] based on race" as "a group classification long
recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited").
114. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
115. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., id. at 364-65 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing and citing
"growing evidence that racial (and other sorts) of heterogeneity actually impairs learning
among black students").

JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW

74

[Vol. 42, No. I

the opportunity to shift the terms of the discussion from the "theoretical" to the
"real."' 17
That is not an outright blessing. Having relied on "social science data ... [that]
significantly extend[s] our understanding of just how social learning turns out to
be,,118 colleges and universities assume the obligation to document the effectiveness
of the policies they have adopted. In particular, they labor under the expectations
created by Justice O'Connor's characterization of the benefits that follow from
diversity as "substantial." 119 Each institution must be prepared to defend its use of
admissions preferences on the basis of real educational benefits that are directly
attributable to actual diversity. In particular, they must document the cause-effect
relationships that follow from the policies they have embraced.
Studies of this sort should avoid the problems inherent in surveys within which
students (or faculty, for that matter) simply "self-assess." Virtually everyone wants
"to be and appear to be good people."' 120 In particular, "self-reports of any socially
12
sensitive topic, including race, are subject to social desirability pressures."'
Surveys linked specifically to diversity or racial climate at an institution that has
made its commitment to affirmative action known pose risks, given that "[t]he more
transparent or obvious the purposes of a questionnaire, the more likely respondents
are to provide the answers they want others to hear about themselves rather than the
ones that may be true." 122 That does not mean that surveys identifying how students
"feel about their experience at the university"' 123 or "how they feel in the
classroom"' 124 have no value. It does mean that they must be crafted and used with
care.
These studies and assessments should also be longitudinal. They should identify
the characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of the students admitted before they
begin their education. They should then document the changes these same students
experience - positive or negative - during their time at the institution. Diversity is
valued precisely because it is believed that it will have an impact. The assumption
is that it will create benefits and outcomes that would not otherwise occur. If the
goal is to produce beneficial educational outcomes, then "meaningful data must be
collected both before and after exposure to the diversity experience in order to

117.
118.

Id. at 330.
Nancy Cantor, Introduction, in DEFENDING DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 8, 8-9 (Patricia Gurin et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Cantor Introduction and Defending Diversity].
119.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
120.
SEYMOUR SUDMAN & NORMAN H. BRADBURN, ASKING QUESTIONS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 6 (1982).
121.
Maria Krysan, Prejudice, Politics, and Public Opinion: Understanding the
Sources of RacialPolicy Attitudes, 26 ANN. REV. SoC. 135, 138 (2000).
122.
BRUCE W. TUCKMAN, CONDUCTING EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 235 (4th ed.
1994) [hereinafter Tuckman].
123.
Joint Appendix at 267a, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013) (No. 11-345) (Deposition of Dr. Bruce Walker (Oct. 7, 2008)) [hereinafter
respectively Walker Deposition and Joint Appendix]. Dr. Walker was at the time Vice
Provost and Director of Undergraduate Admissions.
124. Id.
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determine 125
whether the experience itself produced the [desired] learning
outcomes."
The assessments must also provide context, in this instance, a means for
differentiating between what occurs with and without diversity. It is a basic social
science principle that "[c]omparisons need to be made between students who
experience different types of education" given that "survey research done on a single
126
group often leads to invalid conclusions about cause-and-effect relationships."'
Too often, diversity assessments focus on diversity itself to the exclusion of other
factors, "interpreting outcomes. . . as the effects of diversity alone."' 27 In doing so,
they tend 1to
ignore the importance of determining "what type of response is
'normal."" 28 Information derived from classes or situations where diversity is
minimal or nonexistent can, accordingly, provide "an objective indicator revealing
how people would ideally respond or behave in a given group setting."' 129 Even here,
care must be exercised:
One of the problems in communicating the messages of [intervention]
research is that experimental design in itself encourages disproportionate
attention to be directed toward the critical manipulated variable as the
cause of observed differences between experimental and control groups,
no matter how remote in time or nature the outcome measures are from
1 30
the intervention.
Finally, the studies and assessments should be tied to the compelling interest that
the Court has recognized: "the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
2
made possible
produce." 13'Bakke spoke simply of the "robust exchange of ideas" 13
13 3
Justice O'Connor repeated a portion of this
by a "heterogeneous student body."'
notion, stressing that "'classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply
more interesting' when students have 'the greatest possible variety of
backgrounds." ' 134 But she also enumerated a series of specific, measurable
educational outcomes, including: promoting of cross-racial understanding; breaking

125.
126.
127.

Killenbeck, supra note 43, at 55.
Tuckman, supra note 122, at 235.
Evan P. Apfelbaum et al., Rethinking the Baseline in Diversity Research:

Should We Be Explaining the Effects of Homogeneity?, 9 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL.

Sci. 235, 236 (2014). The authors note that in a sample of "240 research articles on
group diversity capturing the wide range of social, educational, and organizational
contexts in which it is examined ...205 of the ... articles interpreted their results as the
effect of diversity alone." Id.
Id.
128.
129. Id.
130.
Martin Woodhead, When Psychology Informs Public Policy: The Case ofEarly
ChildhoodIntervention, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. 443, 452 (1988).
131.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. See also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725
(characterizing the interest as the "educational and broader socialization benefits [that]
flow from a racially diverse learning environment").
132. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
133. Id. at 314.
134.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 849).
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down racial stereotypes; enabling students to better understand persons of different
workforce and society; and
races; preparing students for an increasingly diverse
135
instilling the skills needed in a global marketplace.
The extent to which these outcomes have been achieved are the sorts of
"determination[s that] ... trained educators make... all the time." 136 The evidence
Texas has offered to date in support of their case - "hard data on minority
admissions, enrollment and racial isolation at UT, as well as discussions with
students about their experiences 1' 37 - does not actually focus on educational
outcomes attributable to a diverse learning environment. That is perhaps
understandable given the current focus of the litigation, which is much more about
the overall design of the admissions policy than the extent to which the benefits
associated with diversity have actually been realized.
That said, both Grutterand FisherI contemplate the production of such evidence
as part of the narrow tailoring inquiry. For example, Justice O'Connor made it clear
that the implementation portion of the constitutional calculus requires that the entity
adopting a race-conscious policy must show how the admissions policies are
"specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish [their] purpose." 138 In a similar
vein, Justice Kennedy spoke directly in FisherI of the need to determine "whether
program
the University has offered sufficient evidence to prove that its admissions
'1 39
is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of diversity."
Those purposes and educational outcomes are not documented by admissions
and enrollment data, commonly described as "structural" or "numerical"
diversity. 140 Simply increasing minority enrollments to the level of a critical mass
poses two problems. The first is a significant constitutional difficulty: "[a]
university is not permitted to define diversity as 'some specified percentage of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin."' 141 Rather, "[tihe
attainment of a diverse student body... serves values beyond race alone, including
enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and
stereotypes."' 4 2 The second is practical. The diversity interest recognized by Justice
Powell in Bakke was intuitive and informal. 143 The one embraced in Grutterwas

135.
Id.
136. UT Fisher I Brief, supra note 55, at 41.
137.
Id.
138. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
139. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
140. Professor Patricia Gurin and her colleagues, for example, describe three types
of diversity, one of which is "structural diversity... the numerical representation of
diverse groups." Patricia Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and
Impact on EducationalOutcomes, 72 HARV. EDUC. REv. 330, 332-33 (2002) [hereinafter
Gurin et al.]. The other two are "informal interactional diversity" and "classroom
diversity." Id. at 333.
141.
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
Id. at 2418.
142.
143.
See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 n. 48 (characterizing "some of the benefits
derived from a diverse student body" as "learning [that] occurs informally" but also
cautioning that "[i]n the nature of things, it is hard to know how, and when, and even if,
this informal 'learning through' diversity actually occurs") (quoting Bowen, Admissions,
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more structured and nuanced. It focused on the extent to which diversity fosters
positive learning outcomes. That reformulation of the diversity rationale imposes
important and special obligations to articulate the expected benefits and document
that they have been realized.
Texas may well have such evidence in hand, or at least be planning to acquire it.
That evidence may well meet the requirements associated with quality social science
findings that are tied directly to the sorts of concrete educational outcomes the Court
discussed in Grutter. And it may well have been gathered in the sound, longitudinal
ways I have discussed.
As matters currently stand, however, the record does not reflect such findings,
with two possible exceptions.'" The first is the University's reliance on student
anecdotal evidence about "how they feel.' ' 14 5 Once again, such information helps to
provide perspectives. But it is most certainly not the sort of rigorous and reliable
findings that can tell us whether a diversity program is generating actual educational
outcomes. That will be especially true if there are no baselines for establishing a
before and after matrix, and no comparison groups to determine if diversity did, or
did not, actually matter.
The second is the University's attempt to document the demographics in
individual classes as part of its argument that "there was jarring evidence of racial
isolation at UT."' 4 6 The proposal that led to the creation of the policy now at issue
stated that "there is a compelling educational interest for the University not to have
large numbers of classes in which there are no students - or only a single student of a given underrepresented race or ethnicity.' 47 Texas thus emphasized at
numerous points over the course of the litigation that classroom demographics
mattered, 148 in particular as part of its efforts to determine if its minority enrollments
had reached a critical mass. 149 Texas now appears to have abandoned any attempt

supra note 94, at 7, 9).
144. My focus here is on the evidence that Texas gathered as it crafted the
admissions scheme, rather than the social science findings provided to the Court about
diversity in general in FisherI, materials likely to be replicated as Fisher I is briefed.
Walker Deposition, supra note 123, at 267a-68a ("We talk to them all the time
145.
about how they feel about their experience at the university, how they feel in the
classroom" and "have students who tell us they feel isolated in the classroom, that they
are the only, or the majority of students tell us that there is no diversity in the
classroom.").
UT Fisher I Brief, supra note 55, at 43.
146.
147.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, PROPOSAL TO CONSIDER RACE AND
ETHNICITY IN ADMISSIONS at 25 (June 25, 2004), reprinted in Supplemental Joint

Appendix at 24a, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2241 (2013) (No. 11-345)
[hereinafter Supplemental Joint Appendix].
See, e.g., UT Fisher I Brief, supra note 55, at 43-44 (arguing that "[i]f '[a]
148.
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation' ... then surely a university may
take into account blatant racial isolation in its classrooms") (quoting ParentsInvolved,
551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); Fisher,631 F.3d at 225 (noting that as part
of the plan developmental process Texas "commissioned two studies to explore whether
[it] was en rolling a critical mass of underrepresented minorities").
See, e.g., Walker Deposition, supra note 123, at 266a. When asked if "the
149.
university ha[s] any means of measuring... progress towards critical mass," Dr. Walker
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to tie the justifications for and potential benefits of its diversity policy to individual
class demographics.' 50 The enrollment data and class numbers will nevertheless be
useful as part of the debate about critical mass. That information does not, however,
help when the focus shifts to educational outcomes attributable to diversity.
B.

Preparing for Work and Citizenship: Beyond the College Years

A second and potentially very significant difference between Bakke and Grutter
is found in Justice O'Connor's decision to look beyond the college years. This was
not a complete departure from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. He noted, for
example, that "[p]hysicians serve a heterogeneous population" and that by
"enrichi[ng] the training of its student body" medical schools could "better equip
[their] graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity."' 51 He
also made passing references to "'leaders' and the "'nations's future." '152 That
discussion was, however, exceedingly brief and offered no empirical support for the
proposition that diversity "better equip[s students] to render with understanding their
' 53
vital service[s] to humanity."'
Justice O'Connor made the "long view" a much more integral part of her
argument for the value of diversity. She emphasized "the overriding importance of
preparing students for work and citizenship."' 154 "Education," she stressed, is
"pivotal to 'sustaining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of society."' 155 She stressed that "student body diversity...

responded "Yes... there is one window.., through which we can see how we're
doing.. . the classroom." Id. See also id. ("[W]e have far too many classrooms where
there's still no or only one minority student."). As the Court of Appeals noted the first
time it had Fisher before it, "UT commission two studies to explore whether the
University was enrolling a critical mass of underrepresented minorities." Fisher, 631
F.3d at 225. The first
focus[ed] on classes of "participatory size," which it defined as between 5 and
24 students. UT analyzed these classes, which included most of its
undergraduate courses, because they offered the best opportunity for robust
classroom discussion, rich soil for diverse interactions. According to the study,
90% of these smaller classes.., had either one or zero African-American
students, and 46% had one or zero Asian-American students, and 43% had one
or zero Hispanic students.
Id.
150. For example, in response to a question from Justice Scalia about whether Texas
"want[s] not just a critical mass in the school at large, but class by class," Gregory Garre,
representing Texas, responded:
No, Your Honor, and let me try to be clear on this. The university has never
asserted a compelling interest in any specific diversity in every single
classroom. It has simply looked to classroom diversity as one dimension of
student body diversity.
Fisher I Transcript, supra note 55, at 34.
151.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
152.
Id. at 312-13 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
153. Id. at 314.
154. Id. at 331.
155.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
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'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and
better prepares them as professionals."' 156 The "real" benefits of diversity, she
noted, included the attainment of "the skills needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace [which] can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints."' 1 7 And she emphasized the need to
promote "[e]effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the
universities as
civic life of our Nation," stressing the role of diverse colleges and
158
"the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders."'
The case for diversity embraced in Grutter involved, accordingly, a quest for
post-graduation skills and perspectives that are instilled as part of "the diffusion of
knowledge and opportunity through [diverse] institutions of higher education."' 159 A
portion of the evidence marshaled for these educational outcomes came from the
same sources that documented general learning outcomes: a friend of the Court
brief, 6 ' a book reporting the results of a major study,161 and two books that collected
individual social science studies. 162 I will discuss these materials in more depth in
Part III-A. It is enough for current purposes to note that these sources contained
information on, for example, "the ways in which diversity at colleges and
63
universities affects lives, policies, and issues beyond the walls of the university."'
Another set of sources came in the form of information and perspectives gleaned
from a series of briefs filed by businesses 164 and, in particular, "former high-ranking
officers and civilian leaders of the United States military."' 165 The two businesses'
briefs stressed both operational and economic benefits for companies that are able
to hire "the most qualified and talented diverse students ... possible."' 166 Such hires
bring "cross-cultural competenc[ies] [that] directly affect[ the] bottom line."' 167 In

156.

Id. at 330 (quoting AERA Brief, supra note 20, at 3).

157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 331.

160.
161.

See AERA Brief, supranote 20.
See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE

SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS

(1998) [hereinafter Bowen & Bok].
162.
See COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS
IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter
Compelling Interest];

DIVERSITY

CHALLENGED:

EVIDENCE

ON

THE

IMPACT

OF

(Gary Orfield ed., 2001) [hereinafter Diversity Challenged].
163. Jeffrey F. Milem, The Educational Benefits of Diversity: Evidence from
Multiple Sources, in Compelling Interest, supra note 162, at 126, 129.
164. See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter 3M Brief]; Brief of General
Motors Corporation as Amicus Curiae, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

02-241) [hereinafter GM Brief].
See Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., Grutter v.
165.

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(No. 02-516) [hereinafter Military Leaders' Brief].
166. 3M Brief, supra note 164, at 9.
167. GM Brief, supra note 164, at 12. See also id. at 14 ("a business' lack of
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particular, these businesses stressed the need for "entrants into the managerial levels
of the business world [who] come equipped with the abilities to work creatively with
persons 68
of any race, ethnicity, or culture and to understand views influenced by those
1
traits."
The perspectives offered were a mixture of "practical experience" 169 and
[a]bundant research [that] has verified [the] conclusion that racial and
ethnic diversity is institutions of higher education assist students in
developing the skills that... are so essential in the success in business
world: (1) understanding the views of persons from different cultures and
170
(2) addressing issues from multiple perspectives.
These corporations also made it clear that they looked to colleges and universities
to provide this sort of education: "Businesses are primarily commercial, not
educational, entities, incapable of replicating the safe academic environments that
foster the 'robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of multiple
171
tongues."'
The brief filed by former military leaders was more pointed and, at least in terms
of volume of discussion in the opinion, more significant.' 72 It highlighted a long
and troubling history of intentional invidious discrimination in the military that
required positive intervention, the end result of which is that "[t]oday, the military
is one of the most integrated institutions in America."' 173 That produced, in turn, a
need for "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and trained to
command our nation's racially diverse ranks [which] is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security. ' 174 This requires
both "qualified minority officer candidates"' 175 and white officers capable of
understanding "what the black man and woman in the service [is] thinking."' 176 This
meant, Justice O'Connor stressed, that "[t]o fulfill its mission, the military 'must be
sensitivity to culturally based beliefs may disaffect an entire market and result in
decreased sales").
168.
Id. at 12.
169. 3M Brief, supra note 164, at 5.
170. GM Brief, supra note 164, at 17-18.
171.
Id. at 21 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603). See also id. ("Only schools, not
businesses, offer a forum for cross-cultural contact among a society of equals, free of
hierarchy.").
172.
Several individuals have argued that the military brief played a significant role
in the decision. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind and Beyond Grutter, 48
ST. Louis U. L.J. 889, 893-94 (2004) (noting that while the military brief "had no direct
relevance to the law school program" it provided "persuasive" evidence of the value of
diversity); Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratzand the Promise of Brown,
48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 899, 946-47 (2004) (noting that the military brief "tied racesensitive admissions to national security" and bolstered the case for diversity as "help[ing
to] develop a cadre of African-American leaders").
173.
Military Leaders' Brief, supra note 165, at 12.
174.
Id. at 5.
175.
Id. at 29.
176.
Id. at 16 (quoting BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY
OF BLACK AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY

317 (1986)).
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selective in admissions for training and education for the officer corps, and it must
a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse
train and educate
177
setting."

'

Grutter's emphasis on matters that lie beyond the college and university years is
important for two reasons. As a practical matter, it broadens the range of educational
outcomes associated with diversity and the contexts within which they are realized.
More importantly, a focus on day-to-day, post-graduate life ties the diversity debate
more tightly into one of the nation's most important problems: the need to deal with
"[b]ias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined
habits of thought [that] keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity
are ever genuinely to become this country's law and
and nondiscrimination
78
practice."

1

IlI. DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION: FROM THEORY TO FACT?

of
I believe it is one thing to seek "enhanced classroom dialogue[,] ... lessening180
' 179
and the "promot[ion of] learning outcomes."
racial isolation and stereotypes"
It is quite another to effectively "'prepare students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society." '181 Grutterdid a good job marshaling evidence in support
of the former. It was less effective in doing the latter. In particular, it did not account
for the realities posed by implicit bias, the "unwitting, unintentional, and
uncontrollable" impulses that infect "the normal, everyday human thought and
activity" of even "the most well-intentioned people."'1 82 This is an important insight,
given its implications for Justice O'Connor's expansion of the argument for diversity
beyond the confines of classroom and campus.
My goal in this Part is to outline what social scientists claim that their work tells
us about the educational value of diversity. The qualification is intentional. The
bitter divide between the supporters and opponents of affirmative action on the
normative side of the debate actually spills over into the social sciences. Professor
Mitchell Chang, for example, is a supporter of these policies who has conducted
research "suggest[ing] that the benefits associated with racial diversity may be even
more far-reaching than previously documented."' 183 He also contends that "[i]t is
nearly impossible to find a published study grounded in the field of higher education
research that rejects Justice Powell's diversity rationale."' 1 4 Professors Abigail and

177. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Military Leaders' Brief, supra note 165, at
29).
178. Adarand Constrictors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
179. FisherI, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.
180.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
181.
Id. (quoting AERA Brief, supra note 20, at 3).
Hardin & Banaji, supra note 21, at 14.
182.
183.
Nida Denson & Mitchell J. Chang, Racial Diversity Matters: The Impact of
Diversity-RelatedStudent Engagement and Institutional Context, 46 AM. EDUC. RES. J.

322, 344 (2009) [hereinafter Denson & Chang].
184. Mitchell James Chang, Quality Matters: Achieving Benefits Associated With
Racial Diversity 9 (Oct., 2011) [hereinafter Quality Matters].
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Stephen Themstrom, in turn, are opponents of affirmative action who have published
studies of their own 18 5 and reviewed those of others. 186 Based on their work and
expertise, they contend that "[i]n reality ... research on race and diversity in the
educational context indicates that diversity as generated
by race-based admissions
' 187
simply does not lead to those purported benefits."
Their respective claims are carefully qualified. Professor Chang's statement
about the studies available speaks interms of the "rationale" for affirmative action,
not its actual results. The Thernstrom rhetoric in turn can plausibly be read to reject
simply the structural consequences of "race-based admissions," as opposed to
outcome associated with proactive programming.
The truth likely lies somewhere in between. The question I want to explore is
whether there is a body of evidence that supports granting admissions preferences
in the name of diversity. The answer is yes. But the collateral reality is that such
materials provide only a necessary first step for any institution that wishes to adopt
or retain such preferences in the current legal environment.
A.

Grutter: The Benefits of Contact Are Real

The prominence and protected place of the diversity rationale in the affirmative
action debate is a relatively recent development. It has been thirty-seven years since
Justice Powell accepted diversity as a compelling interest for constitutional purposes
in Bakke. But his opinion was controversial and did not command widespread
support. Critics found the rationale "weak" 188 and "totally disappointing."' 89 As
one of the individuals who represented the University of California observed, Bakke
"makes a good deal of intuitive sense [b]ut its justification on a principled,
' 190
constitutional level is more problematic."
Many of affirmative action's most ardent supporters accordingly continued to
press their case for admissions preferences as "a strategy for justice."' 91 In

185. See, e.g., STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK
AND WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE (1997).
186.
See, e.g., Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Themstrom, Reflections on The Shape
of the River (Book Review), 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1583 (1999).
187.
Brief of Abigail Themstrom et al. at 4, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133
S. Ct. 2414 (2013) (No. 11-345) [hereinafter Themstrom Brief].
188.
Ronald Dworkin, The Bakke Decision: Did It Decide Anything?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Aug. 17, 1978, at 20, 22 (stating that "the argumentative base of' the Powell
opinion "is weak" because "it does not supply a sound intellectual foundation for the
compromise the public found so attractive").
189. Guido Calabresi, Bakke As Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 427
(1979).
190.
Paul J. Mishkin, The Use of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court
and the Constitutionalityof Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 924 (1983).
191.
Owen M. Fiss, Affirmative Action as a Strategy of Justice, 17 PHIL. & PUB.

POL. 37 (1997). He states that "[t]he diversity rationale seems shallow, for it lacks the
normative pull necessary to justify the costs inevitably entailed in a system of preferential
treatment." Id. at 37. See also JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE Ill, THE BAKKE
CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 228 (1979) (arguing that "[n]one of America's
traditional victims [are] winners in the Bakke case" and that the "real winners [are] the
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particular, they argued that "blacks and Hispanics are the fortuitous beneficiaries of
[rulings] motivated by other interests that can and likely will change when different
priorities assert themselves."' 192 And they looked with disdain on the notion that the
ability of underrepresented minorities to find a place at the academic table somehow
depends on the extent which their presence "sounds in noblesse oblige, not legal
duty, and suggests the giving of charity rather than the granting of relief."' 93
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to characterize any of the interests
associated with the normative case for affirmative action as "compelling" for
constitutional purposes.194 For four members of the current Court, the nicest thing
they can say about affirmative action is that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."1 95 A fifth, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, has made what is at best a cautious and limited case for "a moral
and ethical obligation to fulfill [this Nation's] historic commitment to creating an
integrated society,"' 196 even as he condemns "crude measures [that] threaten to
97
reduce [individuals] to racial chits."1
Colleges and universities are not likely to argue that their admissions preferences
have been implemented with a view toward "the compelling interest of remedying
the [present] effects of [their own] past intentional discrimination."' 98 Sound
recruitment strategies do not include luring underrepresented minority students to
199
campus by touting "the present continuing manifestations of past discrimination."'
country's economically and educationally privileged"); Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant
Disguise:An EmpiricalAnalysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85
IND. L.J. 1197, 1243 (2010) (arguing for the need fora system within which "remediation
diversity can be accepted, and social justice achieved"); Colin S. Diver, From Equality
to Diversity: The Detour From Brown to Grutter,2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 717 (2004)
(declaring that diversity's "moral claim" is "not... trivial" but nevertheless "pales in
significance when set against the corrective justice claim on which the remedial
justification rests").
192.
Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions,103 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1625 (2003).
193.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of
Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REv. 3, 8 (1979).
194.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 720-22 (2007) (stressing that the only two compelling interests supporting the
use of race as a decision-making criterion are "remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination" and the interest in "diversity in higher education"); Wygant v. Jackson

Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986) (rejecting a "role model" justification for
minority preferences); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-11 (rejecting "societal discrimination"
and "improving the delivery of health-care services to communities currently
underserved" as compelling interests).
195.
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 748 (plurality opinion of Chief Justice Roberts,
joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).
196.
Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197.
Id. at 798.
198.
Id. at 720 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992)).
199.
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 56 (4th Cir. 1992). The University of
Maryland, to its credit, admitted its undeniable history of intentional discrimination and
created the "Banneker scholarship program, which is a merit-based program for which
only African-Americans are eligible." Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 152 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1996). However, its focus on "high achieving
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This leaves the diversity rationale as the only viable game in town as both a legal
and practical matter.
There is nothing necessarily wrong with that. Elements of what we now
recognize as "the educational benefits of a diverse student body" 20 have been part
of the higher education calculus for a considerable period of time. In an important
joint statement issued in 1997, sixty-two of the nation's most prestigious institutions
declared that "[f]or several decades - in many cases, far longer - our universities
have assembled their student bodies to take into account many aspects of
diversity. ' 20 1 During that same period the then-President of Harvard, Neil L.
Rudenstine, argued that the intellectual principles supporting diversity could be
traced back over three centuries and that Harvard itself had valued and practiced
20 2
diverse admissions going back to the Civil War.
The problem in the wake of Bakke and before Grutter was the need to tie general
statements about the desire to create "a truly heterogen[e]ous environment that
reflects the rich diversity of the United States" 20 3 to actual evidence documenting
individual educational accomplishments and outcomes. The University of Michigan
recognized early in the development of its defense strategy in Grutterand Gratz that
its case would be immeasurably strengthened if it could show that "education and
learning are socially shared activities that depend in large part on the quality and
effectiveness of the mix of people and ideas in the environment. ' 20 4 That realization
tracked a collateral development: the response by the higher education community
and leading social scientists to what was characterized as the "Hopwood Shock": the
realization that "no consensus existed on the benefits of diversity" and that "[tihe
research had not been done to prove the academic benefits and the necessity of
20 5
affirmative action policies."
Several national conferences were convened and initiatives were undertaken with
a view toward "increas[ing] the sophistication with which society addresses the key
issues of fairness, merit, and the benefits of diversity as they pertain to higher
education." 206 Those efforts did two things. First, they focused attention on an

African-American students" and allocation of a substantial number of scholarships to
"non-residents of Maryland" meant that it was "not narrowly tailored to correct[] the
conditions" that arguably justified it. Id. at 158-159.
200.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 333.
201.
On the Importance of Diversity in University Admissions, ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES
(April
14,
1997),
https://www.aau.edulWorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id= 1652.
202.
Harvard University, The President's Report 1993-1995, at 3-6 (1996).
203.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (quoting Harvard College Admissions Program).
204.
Cantor Introduction, supra note 118, at 8.
205.
Gary Orfield, supra note 162, at 1,3-4. See also Jonathan R. Alger, Unfinished
Homework for Universities: Making the Casefor Affirmative Action, 54 WASH. U. J.
URB.& CONTEMP. L. 73, 74 (1998) ("the unfinished homework in the affirmative. action
debate concerns the development of an articulated vision - supplemented by a strong
evidentiary basis - of the educational benefits of diversity in higher education.").
206.
Kenji Hakuta et al., Preface, in Compelling Interest, supra note 162, at xiii,
xv. The history and strategies are described in this Preface and in the Orfield
Introduction, supra note 205.
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existing body of knowledge documenting the importance of the concepts of
"identity" and "discontinuous intellectual growth. ' 20 7 Second, they generated a
series of studies that addressed directly the central question posed by the affirmative
action litigation: are there in fact specific, positive educational outcomes associated
with diversity?
Many of these materials played a direct role in Grutter. As indicated, Justice
O'Connor cited three books and a friend of the court brief as evidence that the
benefits of diversity are "real. 218 Much of this material drew on "contact theory,"
a body of research that emphasizes the value and impact of "engaging and interacting
with diverse peers." 20 9 An integral part of this is the recognition that "[h]igher
education is more than lectures, lab exercises, and reading lists. The highest quality
education is achieved through interaction among students and faculty." 210 Many
2 11
students "reach college without sustained contact with people of other races."
2 12
Thus, "contact between students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds"
matters, given that "unconscious racial and ethnic stereotyping and prejudice are
pervasive and persistent in our society" 213 and "research shows... that these
implicit attitudes and responses can be ameliorated when students from diverse
live and work with each other intensively, both in and
racial and ethnic backgrounds
2 14
out of the classroom."
Drawing on the work of Erik Erikson 215 and Jean Piaget, 216 one of the key experts
in the Michigan cases, Patricia Y. Gurin, captured the significance of this established
body of work for college and university diversity:
[I]dentity develops best when young people are given a psycho-social
moratorium - a time and place in which they can experiment with
different social roles before making permanent commitments to an
occupation, to intimate relationships, to social groups and communities,

207. Faye J. Crosby & Amy E. Smith, The University of Michigan Case: Social
Scientific Studies ofDiversity and Fairness,in Social Consciousness, supra note 112, at
121,126 [hereinafter Crosby & Smith].
208. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
209. AERA Brief, supra note 20, at 7.
210. Brief of the American Sociological Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 20,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
211.
Id. at 21. Texas, for example, argued strenuously that there is "well-known de
fact segregation throughout much of Texas's secondary school system" and that it
"produces clusters of overwhelmingly majority-minority schools." UT Fisher I Brief,
supra note 55, at 33.
212. APA Grutter Brief, supra note 14, at 3.
213.
Id. at 15.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUTH: CHANGE AND CHALLENGE (1963); ERIK H.
ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY

(2d ed. 1963);

ERIK

H.

ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND TIHE

LIFE CYCLE: SELECTED PAPERS (1959).
216. See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, THE EQUILIBRATION OF COGNITIVE STRUCTURES: THE
CENTRAL PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1985); JEAN PIAGET, THE STAG ES
OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT, IN MEASUREMENT AND PIAGET

eds., 1971)

(Dennis Ross Green et al.
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and to a philosophy of life.
Ideally, the moratorium will involve confrontation with diversity and complexity,
lest young people passively make commitments that follow their past, rather than
2 17
being obliged to think and make decisions that fit their talents and feel authentic.
One of the key strengths in these materials is that they are not tied to conceptions
of race or racial justice. Rather, they reflect generally accepted understandings of
how all individuals progress through a series of developmental stages. 218 In
particular, they focus on the potential significance of encountering new ideas,
information, and individuals during the college years, a time when "students from
varied backgrounds [come] together to create a diverse and complex learning
environment. '21 9 This requires that the college "social milieu [be] different from
the home and community background... diverse and complex enough to encourage
intellectual experimentation and recognition of varied future possibilities." 220 If it
is, developmental theory suggests that an impact on what Professor Gurin described
as "learning outcomes" 221 and "democracy outcomes" 222 can occur "in institutions
'223
explicitly constituted to promote late-adolescent development.
This strength is also a potential weakness. These approaches are constrained by
the reality that they are tied to the "transition to adulthood," a time during which
"events... were more meaningful than those in other periods." 224 This makes this
body of research valuable if the focus is undergraduate education, in particular the
experiences of "typical" students who matriculate directly from or shortly after high
school. Such materials have less force when the focus shifts to graduate and
professional education. They also tend to reflect an emphasis on what is known as

217.

Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, in THE COMPELLING NEED FOR DIVERSITY IN
(John A. Payton ed., 1999), reprintedin 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363,
368 (1999) [hereinafter Gurin Report].
218. But see, Themstrom Brief, supra note 187, at 10 (arguing that "this 'contact
hypothesis' has been discredited by more than halfa century of research and is no longer
accepted by any reputable social scientist"). They argue that "contact" will succeed
"[o]nly under very specific conditions, ones that are unlikely to be met when racial
preferences are used." Id. This may well be true if a given college or university practices
only structural diversity. It is a less tenable objection if these institutions practice what
I characterize as "principled diversity." See infra text accompanying note 300.
219. Gurin Report, supra note 217, at 369.
HIGHER EDUCATION

220.

Id.

221.
Gurin et al., supra note 140, at 336-39. She describes these outcomes as,
among other things, "effortful, mindful, and conscious modes of thought," id. at 337, a
"stronger sense of individuality and a deeper understanding of the social world," id.,
"opportunities to identify discrepancies between students with distinctive pre-college
experiences," id. at 338, and "multiple and different perspectives." Id.
222.
Id. at 339-41. She describes these as the orientations that students will need
to be citizens and leaders in the post collegiate world: perspective-taking, mutuality and
reciprocity, acceptance of conflict as a normal part of life, capacity to perceive
differences and commonalities both within and between social groups, interest in the
wider social world, and citizen participation. Id. at 341.
223.
Id. at 334.
224.
Abigail J. Stewart & Joseph M. Healy, Jr., Linking Individual Development
and Social Change, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 30, 39 (1989).

2016]

DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION

"structural diversity," a concept that focuses largely on "the numerical
225
representation of diverse groups."
226
and
That sort of diversity has been a frequent focus for both litigation
227
Structural diversity is important. The simple presence of students from
research.
a variety of backgrounds, races, and ethnicities matters: "a diverse student body is a
necessary condition for interactions among diverse groups." 228 Viewed in this
manner, structural diversity can be "a catalyst for promoting a more hospitable racial
climate." 229 But, as numerous researchers have emphasized, "necessary [it is] not
to lead to "a more comfortable and less hostile
sufficient" if it is 2actually
30
environment for all."
The research shows that "the educational benefits associated with diversity are
not guaranteed, but conditional."' 231 The interactions must be controlled and
meaningful, 232 and "institutional support may be an especially important condition
for facilitating positive contact effects." 233 More tellingly, it is extremely important
to do this with care, especially at institutions that have made support for diversity

225.
Gurin et al., supra note 140, at 332-33.
See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th
226.
Cir. 2000) ("Law School... use[s] race as a criterion in its admission process so that it
could assure the enrollment of a diverse student body"); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Georgia System, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2000) ("[t]he record
shows that UGA is plying a 'diversity = proportionalism' rationale"); Podberesky v.
Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 367 (D. Md. 1991) (Banneker Scholarship program "aimed
at increasing the representation of historically underrepresented racial groups at public
higher education institutions in Maryland").
See, e.g., Anthony Lising Antonio, The Influence of Friendship Groups on
227.
Intellectual Self-Confidence and Educational Aspirations in College, 75 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 446 (2005); L. Flowers & Ernest T. Pascarella, Does College Racial Composition
Influence the Openness to Diversity of African-American Students?, 40 J. C. STUDENT
DEV. 405 (1999); Gary R. Pike & George D. Kuh, Relationships among Structural
Diversity,Informal PeerInteractionsand Perceptionsof CampusEnvironment, 29 REV.
HIGHER EDUC. 425, 427 (2006) [hereinafter Pike & Kuh].
Pike & Kuh, supra note 227, at 427.
228.
229.
Sylvia Hurtado et al., Assessing the Value of Climate Assessments: Progress
and Future Directions, 1 J.DIVERSITY INHIGHER EDuc. 204, 207 (2008) (hereinafter
Hurtado et al.). But see, Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community
in the Twenty-first Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007) (major study
documenting that "in the short run ... ethnic diversity tend[s] to reduce social solidarity
and social capitol" based on census data "suggest[ing] that in ethnically diverse
neighborhoods... [t]rust (even of one's own race) is lower, altruism and community
cooperation rarer, friends fewer"). As Hardin and Banaji observe, Putnam's research
"show[s] the unsavory result that ethnic diversity may actually increase social distrust."
Hardin & Banaji, supra note 21, at 13.
230.
Hurtado et al., supra note 229, at 207.
Quality Matters, supra note 184, at 10.
231.
232.
See, e.g., Denson & Chang, supra note 183, at 343 (emphasizing the positive
role of "workshops of classes geared toward diversity").
Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
233.
Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006).
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central to their identity. 234 Some individuals come to the diversity table with preexisting antipathies toward particular groups and "[t]he deeply prejudiced both avoid
intergroup contact and resist positive effects from it."' 235 In others, "[t]he human
mind automatically and unintentionally reacts to different groups in divergent ways,
a process that can have unfortunate consequences." 236 Still others respond even
more negatively when larger numbers of the groups they dislike are present, 237 a
reality that may have great bearing given the importance ascribed to "critical mass"
in these debates. 238 The proverbial bottom line is, as Gurin has emphasized, that
'239
simply "[t]alking about these topics can blow up if you don't do it right.
Perhaps the most important outcome in the wake of Grutter and Gratz was the
extent to which it generated a veritable diversity assessment cottage industry. In the
period leading up to those cases the group of social scientists that focused on these
issues was relatively small. Much of their work sounded in contact theory. 240 But
over the course of the 1990s the number of individuals doing focused research

234.
bum-out."

As some scholars in the field have noted, there is a real danger of "diversity
See, e.g., Marcia B. Baxter Magolda, FacilitatingMeaningful Dialogues

About Race, About Campus, Nov.-Dec. 1997, 14, 18 ("1 hear students whisper to
confidants that they are 'sick of diversity discussions,' and my graduate students share
that their undergraduate staff and students complain about attending diversity
workshops.").
235.
Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 29 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 65,

80 (1998).
236.
Justin D. Levinson et al., Implicit Racial Bias: A Social Science Overview, in
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds.,
2012), at 9, 10 [hereinafter Implicit Bias Across the Law].
237.
See Maureen A. Craig & Jennifer A. Richeson, More Diverse Yet Less
Tolerant? How the Increasingly Diverse Racial Landscape Affects White Americans'
RacialAttitudes, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 750, 751 (2014) (noting that
"decades of survey research are consistent with the proposition that minority group size
is associated with prejudice").
238.
See id. at 759 (noting that the studies performed provide "insight into how
Whites may react to ... demographic shift[s] and highlights potential for perceived
threat and intergroup hostility"). The focus in this study was on demographics writ large,

rather than on classroom interactions and/or diversity in a postsecondary setting. It is
nevertheless important to note and account for the reality that "exposure to the changing
racial demographics of the United States and, most notably, the impending 'majority-

minority' U.S. population leads White Americans to express greater racial bias." Id. at
758.
239.
Quoted in Peter Schmidt, 'Intergroup Dialogue' Promoted as Using Racial
Tension to Teach, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. DAILY NEWS, June 16, 2008, available at
http://chronicle.com/daily/2008/07/3829n.htm. So, for example, "[a]t least in some
situations, it appears that attempts to control automatic stereotyping may actually set
people on a path toward stereotyping, especially under conditions where control is
difficult to achieve." Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic
Stereotyping Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient Means of Thought
Control, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1333 (2008) [hereinafter
Stewart & Payne]. College classes in general, and campuses in particular, are of course
classic examples of environments where "control" may well be "difficult to achieve."
240.
See, e.g., Gurin Report, supra note 217.
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increased. They began to develop a "broad range of social science evidence" 241 and,
in a limited number of instances, generate diversity focused surveys 242 and
studies.

243

Since that time researchers have published hundreds of studies, papers, and
commentaries, focusing on these issues. 244 Indeed, in 2008 the American
Psychological Association initiated a scholarly publication devoted exclusively to
issues of diversity, the JournalofDiversity in Higher Education. Thus, the Fisher

I Court had available to it, directly through the parties and amicus briefs, a
substantial body of social science information and research on both sides of the
debate. The Court did not actively discuss that supporting evidence, with the single
exception of Justice Thomas, who spoke in passing of "the educational benefits
allegedly produced by diversity" 245 and "the putative educational benefits of
diversity.- 246 But it did receive a significant number of briefs on both sides of the
diversity debate attesting to the large and growing body of studies attempting to
document, and dispute, both premise and results.
The good news for diversity's proponents, then, is that there is a substantial body
of evidence they can draw on as they develop their admissions policies and
241.
See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Milem, The Educational Benefits of Diversity: Evidence
from Multiple Sources, in Compelling Interest, supra note 162, at 126.
See, e.g., Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education:Student
242.
Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in Diversity Challenged, supra note 162, at 143,

172 (reporting the results of a Gallop Poll of law students at Harvard and Michigan
showing "that large majorities have experienced powerful educational experiences from
interaction with students of other races") [hereinafter Orfield & Whitla].
243.

Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive Educational Effect of Racial Diversity on

Campus, in Diversity Challenged, supra note 162, at 175, 182 (reporting the findings of
a longitudinal study showing "that socializing with someone of another race is positively
related to ... educational outcomes)").

244. See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association as Amicus Curae
at 3, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2414 (2013) (No. 11-345) (noting that
the brief provided "scientific conclusions.., grounded in 79 peer-reviewed studies
reflecting the contemporary social science research on campus diversity" and that
"[n]early all of these studies have been conducted or published since ... Grutter"); Brief
of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 5, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2414 (2013) (No. 11-345) (stating that "[t]he literature
has expanded considerably since Grutter") [hereinafter AERA Fisher I Brief].
245. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 2426. Justice Thomas did take a proactive stand on one major dispute in
the social science literature when he claimed that "the University's discrimination has a
pervasive shifting effect." Id. at 2431. This statement reflected his agreement with the
"mismatch" theory, which postulates that "large racial preferences. . . systematically put
minority students in academic environments where they feel overwhelmed." RICHARD
SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS
STUDENTS IT'S INTENDED TO HELP AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON'T ADMIT IT 4 (2012).

H.

The theory predates Bakke. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, PreferentialAdmissions: An
UnrealSolution to a Real Problem, 2 U. TOL. L. REV. 377, 395 (1970) (discussing the

problems posed by admitting students "to a 'better' school" than those that "would admit
[them] under normal standards"). But see, AERA Fisher I Brief supra note 244, at 26
("Recent research also undermines the so-called mismatch hypothesis proposed by
opponents of race-conscious admissions.").
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educational programs within the constitutional parameters outlined by the Court.
The bad news is that none of this actually matters if the question is whether a specific
affirmative action admissions policy at a specific college or university is both
constitutional and educationally sound. As Justice O'Connor stressed in Grutter:
Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under
the Equal Protection Clause ...
[S]trict scrutiny must take "'relevant
differences' into account."'

...

Indeed ...

that is its "fundamental

purpose." Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable,
and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by
the government decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular
247
context.
In FisherH, for example, the decisionmaker is the University of Texas and the
"particular context" is the actual need for and professed goals of an affirmative
admissions system designed to meet the specific educational needs of the students
at that institution, not at the ones where the published studies were conducted. For
Texas, and for every other institution that actively seeks diversity, the decision to do
so must be principled, by which I mean three things. It must reflect a considered
judgment that diversity is part of that institution's mission. 24 8 It must be pursued for
educational reasons pertinent to the students enrolled at Texas and the programs they
are actually enrolled in.249 And it must be proactive, that is, "positive steps [must
be taken] to see that there is substantial
and meaningful interaction between students
250
of different racial and ethnic groups."
This requires more than attaining a critical mass of previously underrepresented
students.25 1 That is simple structural diversity, which is at best a necessary
precondition to the sorts of deliberate and carefully controlled interventions that will
make possible the attainment of positive educational outcomes. As Chang
emphasizes, "attending to the quality of student's own cross-racial interactions and
'
the quality of the institutional context for diversity is critically important. 252

247. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 228 (1993)).
248.
See Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (stressing that the compelling interest
recognized in Grutter protects a judgment that diversity is "integral to [an institution's]
mission").
249. Id. (stressing the need for "a reasoned, principled explanation for the academic
decision... that a diverse student body would serve [the institution's] educational
goals").
250.
Killenbeck, supra note 43, at 49.
251.
Some people disagree, at least in terms of whether such programming is
required to comply with the Constitution. Professor Evan Caminker, for example, while
still Dean of the Michigan Law School, expressed support for such programming even
as he noted that the Law School's "admissions program passed constitutional muster
despite the absence of [proactive programming.]" Evan Caminker, Post-Admissions
EducationalProgrammingin a Post-Grutter World: A Response to ProfessorBrown, 43

Hous. L. REv. 37, 50 (2006). I disagree, and it is entirely possible that the manner in
which the Court resolves FisherI will foreclose that option.
252. Quality Matters, supra note 184, at 18.
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It also requires that the program be implemented and pursued with longitudinal
assessments of actual educational outcomes as an integral part of its construction.
As I have stressed, the theory is that diversity has an actual, hopefully positive, effect
on actual students. Those effects must be postulated and then measured over time,
based on pre- and post-diversity profiles of the students in question. A survey that
asks students at a given point in time how often they studied with individuals of a
different race, 253 and/or whether diversity "affected their ability to work more
effectively and/or get along better with members of other races," 254 may tell us
something about the extent to which they "have experienced powerful educational
experiences from interaction with students of other races." 255 But it tells us very
little about whether the behaviors and attitudes in question were actually shaped by
the time the students spent at the256institution, as opposed to simply reflecting values
and habits acquired long before.
Institutions practicing principled affirmative action must accordingly be willing
to devote the time and resources necessary to collect appropriate data, over time.
The information they collect should provide a profile of the students both when they
enter and after they graduate, keyed to the educational benefits the institution expects
to be associated with diversity. For example, one of the outcomes many of
diversity's proponents champion is the extent to which it promotes "critical
thinking." 257 Recent research seems to support that conclusion, showing that "[t]he
cognitive effect of diversity experiences appears to be sustained during 4 years of
college and may even increase in magnitude over time."25 The authors cautioned,
however, "that [individual] students' characteristics may often shape the
developmental influence of postsecondary education" and "that purposefully
into the undergraduate experience may not yield
programming exposure to diversity
259
the same benefits to all students."
The studies that have been presented to the Court help inform the debate about
whether diversity is a compelling educational interest in the abstract. They cannot
provide the sort of institution-specific perspectives required to document the value
of diversity as an educational matter for that institution and its students. Ultimately,

253. Orfield & Whitla, supra note 242, at 158.
254. Id. at 159.
255. Id. at 172.
256. Controlling for this is especially important given the findings of some studies
documenting the importance of pre-enrollment experiences and attitudes. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth J. Whitt et al., Student's Openness to Diversity and Challenge in the Second
and Third Years of College, 72 J. HIGHER EDUC. 172,188 (2001) ("[T]he most significant
positive influence on a student's openness to diversity and challenge during the first three
years of college was the student's openness before college.") [hereinafter Whitt et al.].
257. See, e.g., Mitchell J. Chang et al., The Educational Benefits of Sustaining
Cross-RacialInteraction among Undergraduates,77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 430, 449 (2006)
(study documents that "students who have higher levels of [cross-racial interaction] tend
to report significantly larger gains.. . in critical thinking ability").
258. Ernest T. Pascarella et al., Effects of Diversity Experiences on Critical
Thinking Skills Over 4 Years of College, 55 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 86, 90 (2014) [herinafter
Pascarella, Critical Thinking].
259. Id.at 91.
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a complete answer in Fisher II to the question of whether the Texas policy is
narrowly tailored will require that Texas secure that information. But it is critically
important to look beyond the narrow confines of that case and recognize that each
institution that uses preferences is vulnerable, and that each must be prepared to
document that its educational intuition is backed up by the achievement of actual
educational outcomes.
B.

Unappealing Truths: Implicit Bias, Neuroscience, and Diversity

One of the recurring themes in the current national dialogue is the disconnect
between views expressed "by confident commentators who tout America's
successful retreat from its racist past ' 260 and the reality that "[m]assive racial
disparities in America persist - in the criminal justice system, in economic
advancement, in property ownership, and beyond."'26 1
Recent events
notwithstanding, "hostile acts of race discrimination in the United States have
steadily declined during the past century."2 62 Most Americans are accordingly
26 3
shocked when they occur.
Traditional understandings of human behavior and the sources of prejudice
emphasized conscious choices. In his classic work, The NatureofPrejudice,Gordon
Allport stated that "prejudice contains two essential ingredients... an attitude of
favor or disfavor" that is "related to an overgeneralized (and therefore erroneous)
belief.'' 264 Traditional social science research focused on gathering information
about overt beliefs and attitudes. Within that regime, "[t]he most commonly used
technique to determine the extent of racial prejudice has been the survey in which
respondents are asked directly to express their racial attitudes." 265 That reflected the
reality that "[a] quarter century ago, most psychologists believed that human
266
behavior was primarily guided by conscious thoughts and feelings."
This posed two problems. One was methodological. In general, people want "to
be and appear to be good people."267 This means that "[t]he more transparent or

260. Justin D. Levinson, Introduction: Racial Disparities,Social Science, and the
Legal System, in Implicit Bias Across the Law, supra note 236, at I [hereinafter
Levinson, Introduction].
261. Id.
262.
Anthony G. Greenwald & Thomas F. Pettigrew, With Malice Toward None
and Charity for Some, 69 AM. PSYCHOL. 669, 680 (2014) [hereinafter Greenwald &
Pettigrew].
263.
Luciana Lopez, Harriet McLeod, & Alana Wise, Families of South Carolina
Church Massacre Victims Offer Forgiveness, YAHOO! NEWS, June 19, 2015,
http://news.yahoo.com/white-suspect-arrested-killing-nine-black-u-church000635210.html
264.

GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 13 (25th ed. 1979).

265.
Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White
Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 547
(1980).
266.
MAHZARIN R. BANAlI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE xiv (2013) [hereinafter BLIND SPOT].
267.
SEYMOUR SUDMAN & NORMAN H. BRADBURN, ASKING QUESTIONS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 6 (1982).
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obvious the purposes of a questionnaire, the more likely respondents are to provide
the answers they want others to hear about themselves rather than the ones that may
be true." 268 It is not, therefore, surprising that "people tend to report only a slight
269
preference for white Americans over black Americans."
The more serious difficulty is that traditional understandings and techniques do
not account for the reality "that prejudice can operate unwittingly, unintentionally,
and unavoidably." 270 A growing body of studies "consistently reveal[s] a
disquieting but potent truth: despite cultural progress in reducing overt acts of
racism, the effects of implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes are powerful and
pervasive." 271 This divorce between general support for equality and the reality of
persistent stark problems "reveals the complexity of America's racial challenges and
272
the legal system's unwitting complicity in the persistence of racial disparities."
The United States is "a country that for all its progress has yet to completely shed
the burden of hatred and division." 273 This should not come as a great surprise. We
have known for quite some time that there are "unappealing truths about the nature
of the brain and mind that originate from its bounded rationality and largely
unconscious operation." 274 It is accordingly important to recognize that "human
mental machinery can be skewed by lurking stereotypes, often bending to
accommodate hidden biases reinforced by years of social learning." 275 These are
when the focus is "social judgment, including, but not limited
especially pronounced 276
to, ethnicity and race."
Systematic attention to this reality has increased in recent years, as "new
of
techniques... opened up the black box of cognition, marrying the insights 277
traditional psychology with a functional analysis of the biology of brain activity.
This emerging body of knowledge includes two distinct but interrelated fields. The
first is "implicit social cognition," which involves "a new generation of discoveries
about automatic, nonconscious, or implicit preferences and beliefs. '278 The second
is "cognitive neuroscience," defined as "the study of thought and behavior informed
of neurosciences about the physical nature of the brain
by the discoveries
279
process."

268. Tuckman, supra note 122, at 235.
269. Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. &
Soc. Sci. 427, 431 (2007) [hereinafter Lane et al.].
270. Hardin & Banaji, supra note 21, at 14.
271. Levinson, Introduction, supra note 236, at 2.
272. Id. at 1.
273. Peter Baker, After CharlestonShooting, a Sense at the White House of Horror,
Loss and Resolve, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2015, at A18.
274. Lane, supra note 269, at 427-28.
275. Levinson, supra note 236, at 2.
276. Hardin & Bannaji, supra note 21, at 5.
277. Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience,
6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 61, 62 (2010) [hereinafter Goodenough& Tucker].
278. Lane, supra note 269, at 429.
279. Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 277, at 62.
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Two types of cognitive constructs factor into these discussions. The first are
"implicit attitudes," defined as "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately
identified) traces of past experiences that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling,
thought, or action toward social objects. '280 Attitudes, sometimes characterized as
"preferences," describe the way we think about things. Attitudes are "favorable or
unfavorable dispositions toward social objects, such as people, places, and
policies." 28 1 Explicit attitudes are the product of deliberation and choice. Implicit
attitudes, in turn, are "automatically triggered" and "can influence behavior without
our awareness."

282

The second construct is "implicit stereotypes," which "are the introspectively
unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate
attributions of qualities to members of a social category." 283 Stereotypes are just
what the term implies: beliefs about people that assign specific qualities to an
individual based on that person's membership in a group. They are also pervasive,
as "stereotyping by social category
is so widely practiced as to deserve recognition
4
' 28
as a universal human trait.

Attitudes and stereotypes are central facets of the diversity debate. Grutter, for
example, spoke expressly of the ability of an affirmative "admissions policy [that]
promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps break down racial stereotypes, and
'enables [students] to better understand persons of different races."' 28 5 As part of
this, one of the "unappealing truths" that must be taken into account in the quest for
diversity is the extent to which "nonconscious stereotypes or shortcuts embedded in
the human mind cause the individual to evaluate members of different social groups
in a disparate manner." 286 This insight is especially important if, as is too often the
case, an institution pursues simple structural diversity under the assumption that
"'unplanned, casual encounters.., can be subtle and yet powerful sources of
287
improved understanding and personal growth.'
The pervasiveness and potential impact of implicit bias is then a source of
concern. Fortunately, the same work that has facilitated identification of the
phenomenon has generated a reasonable understanding of its sources and methods
for its detection. In turn, this work suggests strategies and interventions that may
reduce implicit bias. Interestingly, these studies have also called into question a
series of traditional assumptions about both human behavior and the brain.

280.

Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:

Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 8 (1995) [hereinafter

Greenwald & Banaji].
281.

Id. at 7.

282.

Damian Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes, 17 CURRENT
164, 164 (2008).
Greenwald & Banaji, supranote 280, at 15.
BLIND SPOT, supra note 264, at 89.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821,

DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.

283.
284.
285.

851 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).

286.
287.

Hutchinson, supra note 22, at 37.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 n. 48 (quoting Bowen,

ADMISSIONS,

supra note 94, at
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The traditional view was that "[o]nce a stereotype is so entrenched that it
becomes activated automatically, there is really little that can be done to control its
influence." 28 8 The thinking was that "[r]ealistically, there is little that will be done
of
about such nonconscious effects in the real world - mainly because, in the words 289
Hall of Fame baseball pitcher Bob Feller, "'You can't hit what you can't see."'
Initial research on implicit bias seemed consistent with this, suggesting that
"automatic biases were likely to be very rigid and require arduous learning processes
to change." 29° Indeed, some studies suggested a "'backfire' effect[]," that is, an
29
actual increase in stereotyping. '
That has given way to a growing consensus that "implicit preferences and
beliefs ... despite their seemingly uncontrollable nature, are malleable" 292 and
"[d]espite their prevalence and magnitude... are not impervious to change." 293 The
predicates for potential change are both personal and situational. 294 In particular,
they are subject "to social influence," 295 with the research showing "that changes in
296
social organization ... predict corresponding changes in implicit prejudice."
Various factors - virtually all of which are the hallmarks of student body diversity come into play, including "the context surrounding the stimulus" 297 and "promotion
298
In particular, positive changes are associated with
of counter-stereotypes."
'
"effortful practice, "299 a characteristic central to what I have characterized as
300

principled diversity.
Individuals who study implicit bias have developed ways to detect it and
interventions designed to ameliorate it. Detection and measurement techniques
avoid using the self-report approach. 30 1 Instead, they focus on "the outcome[s] of a

John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability
288.
of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

361,378
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds. 1999).
Id.
Stewart & Payne, supra note 239, at 1333.
Id.
Lane, supra note 274, at 429.
Id. at 437.

See e.g., Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and
294.
Prejudice,6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 257 (2002) (discussing the focus

on both individual "motives" and "social context").
295.
Hardin & Banaji, supra note 21, at 15.
296. Id. at 21.
Stewart & Payne, supra note 239, at 1333.
297.
Id.
298.
Id. See also Robyn K. Mallett & Timothy D. Wilson, Increasing Positive
299.
Intergroup Contact,46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 382 (2009) [hereinafter Mallett

& Wilson]. They stress that given inherent "anxiety about inter-racial interactions" one
key factor in such programming is "to improve the quality of th[e] interaction." Id. at
383.
300.
See supra text accompanying note 218.

301.
See Robert J. Snowden & Nicola S. Gray, Implicit Social Cognition in Forensic
Settings, in HANDBOOK OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT, THEORY, AND
APPLICATIONS

522, 522-523 (Bertram Grawronski & B. Keith Payne eds., 2010)
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measurement procedure that is causally produced by psychological attributes in an
automatic manner." 30 2 The focus is "on obtaining evidence for the causal relation
between the to-be-measured attribute and the measure." 30 3 The most important of
these is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which "provides a measure of strengths
of automatic associations" 30 4 The IAT "infers ... associations from performances

that are influenced by those associations in a manner that is not discerned by
respondents." 30 5 The Race IAT, for example, "assesses implicit attitudes toward
African Americans (AA) relative to European Americans (EA). '306 It asks
individuals to distinguish African-American faces from European American faces
and "pleasant-meaning from unpleasant-meaning words." 307 The measures it
produces are "based on the relative speeds of responding" and the strength of the
30 8
associations observed reveal "implicit attitudinal preferences."
Various interventions, in turn, can be used to alter attitudes and beliefs. 30 9 One
of the most useful involves what the research characterizes as "counter-stereotypical
exemplars," a process in which individuals are shown images of (for example)
"admired African American[s] and disliked European American[s]. '' 310 A variation
on this approach involves having individuals "imagine a positive interaction with a
Black person [and] a negative interaction with a White person." 3 11 Post-exposure
testing using the Race TAT can then identify whether the interventions had any
impact of implicit attitudes. Initial studies showed "modest... reduction, but not
elimination, of implicit biases." 312 More recent work, this time focusing on first
year, first semester college students "demonstrated a simple way of correcting
Whites' negative expectations about inter-racial interactions and increasing the
3 13
positivity of those interactions."
Another approach especially suitable in the context of student body diversity
involves creating situations in which individuals work together toward a common
[hereinafter Handbook] (discussing the shortcomings in self-reports given the human
tendency to harbor bias "but choose to state a quite different proposition").
302.

Jan De Houwer & Agnes Moors, Implicit Measures; Similarities and

Differences, in HANDBOOK, supra note 301, at 176-77.
303.
Id.

304.
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit
Association Test, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003).

305.

Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific

Foundations,94 CALIF. L. REv. 945, 952 (2006).

306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 953.

309.
See, e.g., Calvin K. Lai ct al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: I. A
Comparative Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1765

(2014) [hereinafter Lai].
310.
Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and
Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 802 (2001).

311.
312.
313.

Lai, supra note 309, at 1770.
Greenwald & Krieger, supranote 305, at 964.
Mallett & Wilson, supra note 299, at 380.
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goal. The underlying theory is that "the recategorization of former out-group
members as in-group members should result in more positive attitudes toward
them."3' 14 In particular, "group membership is internalized as a social identity and
subsequent group functioning... shifts from individual to collective selfdefinitions." 315 The net result is that "positive intergroup attitudes [are] fostered by
linking the self to outgroups through common ingroup membership...."316
In one experiment white students used computer models to form groups. Those
who "formed a group including several Black individuals and practiced associating
themselves and the Black group members subsequently scored lower on a prejudice
IAT than participants in a control condition."3 17 The conclusion was "that practicing
counterstereotyping and conditioning a link between the self and outgroup members
significantly reduced implicit prejudice." 3 18 In another, "non-Latino American
[students] freely took part in a cooperative cultural activity with a Latino American
(Mexican American) peer." 319 The study found that "freely working.., on a...
prejudice" and "led to more positive intergroup
cultural task reduced implicit..,
320
attitudes halfa year later."
A final representative approach has special salience in the light of current events.
A long line of studies and experiments have documented the connection between
32 1
In particular,
negative stereotypes and reflexive responses in stress situations.
researchers have focused on "speculation that officers use race when making the
decision to shoot. ' 322 They developed various controlled experiments to test
whether an individual would be more likely to reflexively shoot based on the race of
the individual posing the threat. In one, involving "a simple videogame...
participants shot armed Blacks more quickly than armed Whites, and decided not to
323
In another, participants
shoot armed Whites more quickly than armed Blacks."
were asked to "categorize[] pictures of either handguns or hand tools following the

Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of
314.
Recategorization, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 239, 240 (1989).
315.
Lowell Geartner et al., Us Without Them: Evidencefor an Intragroup Origin
ofPositive In-Group Regard, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 426, 427 (2006).
316.
Anna Woodcock & Margo J. Monteith, ForgingLinks with the Self to Combat
Implicit Bias, 16 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 445, 446 (2012) [hereinafter
Woodcook & Monteith].
Id. at 457.
317.
Id. at 456.
318.
Tiffany N. Brannon & Gregory M. Walton, Enacting CulturalInterests: How
319.
Intergroup Contact Reduces Prejudiceby SparkingInterest in an Out-Group 's Culture,
24 PSYCHOL. REv. 1947, 1949 (2013).
320.
Id. at 1955.
321.
See, e.g., B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic
and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 181 (2001) (noting interest in "the relationship between automatic and
controlled cognition" in the context of the Amidou Diallo shooting) [hereinafter Payne].
Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentialsand the Decision to Shoot: The
322.
Role of Threat Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
120, 210 (2005).
Id. at 126.
323.
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presentation of White or Black faces." 324 The studies found "that the presence of
racial information systematically biases.., the identification of weapons" with
"non-Black participants... faster to identify guns when they were primed by Black
325
versus White faces."
Subsequent work has focused on interventions, including, the impact of
"training." 326 In one especially interesting study involving 75 undergraduates,
researchers "used different versions of a newspaper article to link Blacks or Whites
[as suspects] to the concept of danger and crime." 327 The study group was divided
into "novices" and "experts," with the results showing that "novices were highly
sensitive to the manipulation of stereotype[s]" while "expert[s] . . . were essentially
unaffected by the newspaper manipulation."328
As is to be expected, this body of work has its limits. Critics have, for example,
argued that "the IAT provides little insight into who will discriminate against whom,
and provides no more insight than [other] explicit measures ..."329 That may or
may not be the case. 33 0 What is clear is that this body of work needs to be
supplemented with precisely the same sorts of studies I have argued are required to
establish the validity of contact theory's benefits: "large-scale, well-controlled
longitudinal investigations that model IAT prediction of socially meaningful criteria
in organizations, schools, hospitals, and other contexts in which implicit bias is of
331
direct concern."
A more telling critique is that the interventions have only limited effects. Two
of the most important scholars in this area, for example, have observed that "[ljike
stretched rubber bands, the associations modified ...likely soon return to their
earlier configuration. Such elastic changes can be consequential, but they will
require replication prior to each occasion on which one wishes them to be in
effect. '332 There is, however, an important difference between many of the studies
324.

David M. Amodio et al., Neural Signalsfor the Detection of Unintentional

Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 88, 89 (2004).

Payne, supra note 321, at 187.
325.
326. See, e.g., Jessica J. Sim et al., UnderstandingPolice and Expert Performance:
Whether Training Attenuates (vs. Exacerbates) Stereotype Bias and the Decision to
Shoot, 39 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 291 (2013) [hereinafter Sim]; Joshua
Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision
to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007).
327.
Sim, supra note 326, at 300.
Id.
328.
329. Frederick L. Oswald et al., Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination:A
Meta-Analysis of IA T CriterionScores, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 171, 188
(2013).
330. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Statistically Small Effects of the
Implicit Association Test Can Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 553, 560 (2015) (arguing that even in the light of the Oswald et al., supra note
329, criticisms the "level of correlational predictive validity of IAT measures represents
potential for discriminatory impacts with substantial societal significance").
331.
Frederick L. Oswald et al., Using the IAT to Predict Ethnic and Racial
Discrimination:Small Effect Sizes of Unknown Social Significance, 108 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 562, 569 (2015).
BLIND SPOT, supra note 264, at 152.
332.
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that have been done in this field and what is likely to occur if the techniques are
employed routinely in multiple courses during the full span of undergraduate,
graduate, or professional education. This assumes commitments of the sort that
many colleges and universities have not made to date. But if undertaken, there is
practice and training... implicit attitude
reason to believe that "given sufficient
333
changes can remain stable over time."
The insights gleaned from implicit social cognition are supplemented by a second
recent body of work, cognitive neuroscience, which has been made possible by
significant advances in "functional human brain imaging." 334 The underlying
assumption is "that the approach taken by the individual's mind to solve a problem
will be physically present in the workings of her brain. '335 The application of
knowledge about the brain to these matters had been hampered by the "[l]ong-held
scientific paradigm that the brain stops growing or changing early in life, and as a
result you could not actually 'change' your brain no matter what you thought."3'36
That tracked a core criticism of the early diversity studies, that its effects are much
more robust for late adolescents or young adults-individuals who have not reached
a stage in life where their attitudes, beliefs, and perspectives have solidified - than
they are for true adults. In this instance, however, scientific developments reveal a
basis for believing that the potential for individual development continues over time.
The focus here is a body of work that makes use of technology that now allows
"neuroscientists... to 'see inside' the brain, while it was working. '337 In particular,
the technology has enabled researchers to identify and focus on areas of the brain
associated with mental inferences about individuals and groups. 3 38 It also led to the
rejection of "the 'old dogma' that there is a fixed number of neurons in the adult
brain that cannot be replaced when the cells die." 339 Instead, "scientists [now see]
that the human brain, instead of being set and static, continually reprogram[s] and
restructure[s] itself... gr[owing] and chang[ing], moment by moment, input by
input, and thought by thought. ' 340 Originally referred to simply as "plasticity," what
is now characterized as "neuroplasticity" or "neuronal plasticity" is a body of
research based on the realization "that learning occurs because 34of1 changes in the
efficacy of synaptic transmission along specific brain pathways."

Sabine Glock & Carrie Kovacs, EducationalPsychology: Using Insightsfrom
333.
Implicit Attitude Measures, 25 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 503, 515 (2013).
Michael 1. Posner & Gregory J. DiGirolamo, Cognitive Neuroscience: Origins
334.
and Promise, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 873, 874 (2000).
335. Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 277, at 62.
336. Shad Helmstetter, THE POWER OF NEURO-PLASTICITY 12 (2014) [hereinafter
POWER OF NEURO-PLASTICITY].

337. Id. at 14.
338. See generally, Juan Manuel Contreras et al., Common Brain Regions with
Distinct PatternsofNeural Responses duringMentalizingabout Groups andIndividuals,
25 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1406 (2013).
339. Eberhard Fuchs & Gabrielle Flugge, Adult Neuroplasticity: More Than 40
Years ofResearch, 2014 NEURAL PLASTICITY 1.
340. POWER OF NEUROPLASTICITY, supra note 336, at 14.
341.
G. Berlucchi & H. A. Buchtel, Neuronal Plasticity: HistoricalRoots and
Evolution ofMeaning, 192 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 307, 308 (2009).
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Individuals interested in implicit bias can accordingly now use "[n]euroscientific
techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
electroenceephalography (EEG)... to begin to elucidate the neural systems
involved in the expression and regulation of implicit attitudes." 342 In particular,
neuroscience has "identified]... the amygdala as a brain region involved in the
expression of implicit attitudes." 34 3 The amygdala is "a small group of nuclei" that
"is well situated to combine social and cognitive input and to modulate cognition
and automatic aspects of behavior" and "is sensitive to the types of social cues
imperative in the formation of implicit attitudes." 344 Research has shown, for
example, that "[v]iewing images of racial out-group members activates the
amygdala more than does viewing of racial in-group members ... and [that] this
345
difference in amygdala activity correlates with implicit measures of racial bias."
It has also been shown that the amygdala is "flexible" and "can respond to
positive and negative stimuli, stimulus intensity, and, more generally, the
motivational relevance of stimuli. 3 46 The research shows that "[i]ndividual
differences, stimulus context, and social goals all influence relatively automatic
biases." 347 This means that interventions can be developed to moderate and even
possibly eliminate biased responses. In one study differentiating between "[s]imple
visual inspection" 348 and "social categorization of... faces" 349 showed "that a
stereotyped or prejudiced response to an out-group member requires, at a minimum,
'350
that the stimulus. . . be processed deeply enough that it represents a social target.
That meant that "perceivers can change the social context in which they view a target
person" and that "regardless of an individual's long-term tendencies toward
prejudice, responses to the target person varied with controllable processing
goals." 35 1 That will particularly be the case where care is taken to direct
352
"attention... away from social category and toward the individual person."
This is consistent with the general belief that "[r]esearch on plasticity has
revealed new information about and realistic hope for ways to shape the circuitry of
emotion to promote increased well-being and positive affect." 353 It is also
342.

Damian Stanley et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Attitudes, 17 CURRENT
164, 165 (2008) [hereinafter Stanley].
343. Id. at 165.
344. Id.
345. Jay J. Van Bavel et al., The Neural Substratesof In-Group Bias: A Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation, 19 PSYCHOL. SCi. 1131, 1132 (2008)
(citations omitted).
346. Id. at 1337.
347. Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: SocialCognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 56
(2005).
348. Id. at 61.
349. Id. at 58.
350. Id. at 61.
351.
Id.
352. Stanley, supra note 342, at 167.
353. Richard J. Davidson et al., Emotion, Plasticity, Context, and Regulation:
Perspectives From Affective Neuroscience, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 890, 904 (2000).
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.
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significant in the light of two aspects of Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in
Grutter. The first is the assumption that one important value of diversity is its ability
to "diminish[] the force of.. . stereotypes" 354 and eliminate situations where
previously "underrepresented minority students [are viewed as] spokespersons for
their race." 355 An institution that treats diversity as an opportunity for creative and
proactive education, rather than as simple numbers, can use the sorts of approaches
described in the implicit bias literature to work toward the elimination of
inappropriate attitudes and beliefs. The American Psychological Association made
that point in a brief filed in Grutter, observing that "one promising strategy for
attacking unconscious social biases is to 'create the social conditions that allow new
about social groups that blur the bright line that
associations and new learning
356
demarcates social groups."'
The second element of Grutterworth noting here is its emphasis on much more
than a simple "robust exchange of ideas" in class and during campus life. 357 Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court made post-enrollment perspectives and skills a
central element in her declaration that the "benefits [of diversity] are not theoretical
but real. ' 358 Cognitive neuroscience tells us that human development is a lifelong
process. It is accordingly significant that the transformations required to detect and
move beyond implicit biases can occur after maturation. Student body diversity can
- if handled properly - promote "cultural competence and 'pluralistic
orientation,' 359 characteristics that "prepar[e] students for the challenges and
complexities of a diverse society.

360

IV. THINKING LIKE A LAWYER? LEGAL EDUCATION AND DIVERSITY
Justice Brandeis famously observed that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of our
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of

the country. ' 361 His observation stands for the notion that individual states might
serve as laboratories of democracy, places where we can develop "policies 'more
354.
355.

Grutter,539 U.S. at 333.
Id. at 319.

356.

APA Grutter Brief, supranote 14, at 12-13 (quoting Mahzarin R. Banaji et al.,

The Social Unconscious, BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (A[braham]
Tesser & N[orbert] Schwartz eds., 2001)).
Bakke, 438 U.S at 312-13 (focusing almost exclusively on "'exposure' to the
357.
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples").
358.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
359.
Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association at 34, Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). Both this brief and the
APA Grutter Brief, supra note 14, discussing the significance and potential malleability
of implicit bias at some length. It is surprising that Justice O'Connor did not at least note
the existence of the phenomenon in her opinion in Grutter,much less cite the APA Brief.
360.
Mark E. Engberg, Educating the Workforce for the 21s' Century: A CrossDisciplinary Analysis of the Impact of the UndergraduateExperience on Students'
Development of a PluralisticOrientation,48 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 283, 285 (2007).
361.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting).
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sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society' [and experience]
'innovation and experimentation'... ."362
I suggest in this final Part that this nation's law schools can, and should, serve as
the laboratories within which the view of affirmative action and diversity I have
sketched in this Article can be tested and refined. This will not, I hasten to add, be
an act of courage on their part. Rather, it is now a requirement imposed on them by
3 63
This is not to say that
the current accreditation standards adopted by the ABA.
most law schools in this nation are not enthusiastic supporters and practitioners of
preferential admissions. They have in fact been so for a considerable period of
time. 364 Rather, I am arguing that the current ABA accreditation regime imposes a
combination of obligations on every law school to both pursue diversity and
document educational outcomes. That reality, coupled with unique aspects of how
virtually all law schools operate provides a matrix within which the assumptions and
obligations of a truly narrowly tailored approach to diversity and inclusion can be
implemented and assessed.
A.

Legal Education, Diversity, and Outcomes: An Obligation, Not a
Choice

One of the most interesting and overlooked realities in the debate about
affirmative admissions policies is that there are actually two groups of institutions.
The first are those that champion diversity, arguably virtually every one of this
nation's colleges and universities. The second is those that have an actual need to
use preferences in admissions. That is not a problem for most institutions. In their
path-breaking study, The Shape of the River, William G. Bowen and Derek Bok
stressed that "[o]ne of the most common misunderstandings concerns the number of
institutions that actually take account of race in making admissions decisions. Many
people are unaware of how few colleges and universities have enough applicants to
be able to pick and choose among them."3 65 Noting that "[t]here is no single,
unambiguous way of identifying the number of such schools," they stated that "we
20 to 30 percent of all four-year colleges and universities
estimate that only about
366
are in this category."

Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (quoting Gregory v.
362.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
See infra Section IV-A.
363.
364. See e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for the Association of American Law Schools at
22, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811) [hereinafter
AALS Bakke Brief] ("[r]esponding to the moral pressures of the civil rights
movement ... in the mid-1960s, ... law schools began in a variety of ways to take
affirmative steps to attain more than a token enrollment of minority students").
Bowen & Bok, supra note 161, at 15.
365.
366. Id. The actual number may well be much smaller. In an important pre-Grutter
survey, Michael T. Nettles and his colleagues determined that only about 6.6% of this
nation's colleges and universities are "'serious affirmative action institutions'...
meaning that they are the institutions where there has been the greatest gain in numbers
of African American and Hispanic students in the past decade or so." Karin Chenoweth,
Not Guilty!, BLACK ISSUES 1N HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 30, 1997, at 10 (Vol. 14, No. 18).
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This changes when the focus shifts to the schools and colleges that offer the first
professional degree in law. All of these are by nature and design both selective and
routinely confronted by an excess of applications from qualified applicants. As
367
Bowen and Bok emphasized "[in law and medicine, all schools are selective."
This is true even for institutions that are widely viewed as having lax368
standards. The
rate of acceptance may be high, but not all who apply are admitted.
Law schools in particular are avid supporters and practitioners of affirmative
admissions. In the brief it filed in the Bakke litigation, the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) stated that "almost all accredited American law schools have
adopted 'special admissions programs' which give preference in admissions to
blacks and members of other 'discrete and insular' minorities." 369 That has not
changed. The belief that "diversity ... contributes to a better legal education...
has become conventional wisdom that is warmly embraced by the vast majority of
leaders in higher education today. '370 It is, the AALS declared in FisherI, one of
37 1
legal education's "core values."
Diversity is also a goal that requires "explicit measures to achieve racially diverse
student bodies." 372 The two basic statistical admissions rubrics for law schools are
undergraduate grade point averages and scores on the Law School Admissions Test.
Those "raw numbers are startling" 373 and "[tihe simple, demonstrable statistical fact
is that most selective law schools in this country will have almost no students of374a
certain race unless they adopt admissions policies designed to alter that outcome."
It is accordingly hardly surprising that the studies show
that "[r]acial preferences are
375
particularly large and mechanical at law schools."
The interplay between legal education's support for diversity and the reality that
principled diversity is grounded in educational values will soon become a pressing
matter for every law school in the nation given the combined effect of two provisions
367. Bowen & Bok, supra note 161, at 282. I discuss medical school accreditation
and diversity infra at text accompanying note 420.
368. For example, the most recently available ABA data show that while Western
Michigan University Cooley Law School admits slightly over 85% of the people who
apply, it nevertheless did reject 216 applicants.

See Western Michigan University

Cooley
Law
School 2014
Standard
509
Information
Report,
http://www.cooley.edu/publicinformation/ docs/2014 aba standard 509 information.
pdf.
369. AALS Bakke Brief, supra note 359, at 3.
370.
Kevin R. Johnson, The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law
Schools: One Dean'sPerspective, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1549, 1553 (2011).

371.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools at 1, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2414 (2013).
372.
Brief of the Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae at 2, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2414 (2013).
373.
Id. at 10.
374.
Id. at 2.
375.
Peter Arcidiacono, A Conversation on the Nature, Effects, and Future of
Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 683, 686
(2015). This conclusion was based on the results of a forthcoming study, Peter
Arcidiacono & Michael Lovenheim, Affirmative Action and the Quality-FitTradeoff J.
ECON. LIT. (forthcoming 2015).
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in the most recent iteration of the American Bar Association's StandardsandRules
of Procedurefor Approval of Law Schools. 37 6 The first is Standard 206, which
addresses "Diversity and Inclusion." 377 The second is Standard 302, which focuses
on "Learning Outcomes." 37 s Taken together, these accreditation rules have
profound implications. Under them, what was once simply an article of faith has
become a series of positive obligations. It is no longer enough for a law school to
embrace diversity as a value and take only those steps it deems appropriate to admit
a diverse entering class. Rather, after first actually achieving that goal - a result that
is now required - a law school must create and maintain proactive educational
programs that produce actual educational outcomes, documented by rigorous,
ongoing assessment.
This becomes apparent when we examine how the ABA standards have evolved
over the years. The pre-Bakke diversity formulation spoke simply of the need to
"maintain equality of opportunity in legal education without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex." 379 As
phrased, that standard reflected "classic liberalism's command not to
discriminate." 380 That began to change after Bakke, as the ABA made two changes
in the standards. The first was to broaden the non-discrimination mandate into a
more proactive policy:
Consistent with sound educational policy and the Standards, the law
school shall demonstrate, or have carried out and maintained, by concrete
action, a commitment to providing full opportunities for the study of law
and entry into the profession by qualified members of groups (notably
racial and ethnic minorities) which have been victims of discrimination
in various forms.

38 1

376.
A. B. A., ABA StandardsandRules of Procedurefor Approval ofLaw Schools,
2014-2015 (2014) [hereinafter Current ABA Standards]. Compliance with the ABA
standards and rules is incredibly important. The ABA is the only accrediting body for
law schools recognized by the United States Department of Education. Id. at vii ("Since

1952, the [ABA] has been approved by the United States Department of Education as
the recognized national agency for the accreditation of programs leading to the J.D.
degree."). A degree from an accredited law school is, in turn, a prerequisite for taking
the bar examination in virtually every state. Id. ("Almost all jurisdictions rely
exclusively on ABA approval of a law school to determine whether the jurisdiction's

legal education requirement for admission to the bar is satisfied.").
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 12-13.
Current ABA Standards, supra note 376, at 15-16.
A.B.A., Approval of Law Schools, American Bar Associations Standards and

Rules of Procedure, Standard 211 (1979). The same language recurred in the 1983

version.
380.
Hugh Davis Graham, The Originsof Affirmative Action: Civil Rights and the
Regulatory State, 523 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 50, 54 (1992).
381.
A. B. A., Standardsand Rules of Procedurefor the Approval of Law Schools
and Interpretations,Standard 212 (Aug. 1981).
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The second was to add the admonition that a "law school shall not use admission
a diverse student body in terms of race, color, religion, national
policies that preclude
382
origin, or sex."
These two requirements remained in place leading up to Grutter,albeit with some
minor changes. In the last iteration before Grutter the ABA dropped the reference
to "diversity" from what had been Standard 211 (b) and spoke simply of a need not
to discriminate in admissions on the basis of various characteristics as part of
"Equality of Opportunity." 383 The "concrete action" provision remained in the
part of a requirement that law
Standards virtually verbatim, albeit now styled as 384
schools demonstrate an "Equal Opportunity Effort.
Neither the Standards nor the Interpretations fleshing them out expressly
commanded any particular result. Law schools were required to "exhibit a special
concern for determining the potential of these applicants through the admissions
process" 385 and to "prepare a written plan describing its current program and
efforts." 386 They were also given a series of examples of "the kinds of actions that
can demonstrate" such a commitment. 387 That list included such traditional process
elements as recruitment, 388 participation in programs and efforts that would
"encourage [minority students] to study law," 389 and "enable... disadvantaged
students to attend law school,' 390 and the creation of "programs that assist in meeting
391
the unusual financial needs of many minority law students."
That changed in the wake of Grutter. Consistent with the theory embraced by
the majority in that decision, the initial post-Grutter iteration changed the name of
the standard from "Equal Opportunity Effort" to "Equal Opportunity and
Diversity." 392 It continued the requirement for "concrete action" directed toward
"full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession." 393 But for the
first time, it added the need to "demonstrate... a commitment to having a student
body that is diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity. ' 394 In particular,
expressly citing Grutter, the ABA transformed Justice O'Connor's statement there
that laws schools should "aspire to 'achieve that diversity which has the potential to

382. Id., Standard 211 (b).
383.
A.B.A., Standardsfor Approval of Law Schools 2001-2002, at 19, Standard
210(b) [hereinafter 2001-2002 ABA Standards]. One important development was the
addition of the category "sexual orientation" to the list of protected classes.
384. Id. at 21, Standard 211.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 22, Interpretation 211-2.
387. Id. at 21, Interpretation 211-1.
388. Id., Interpretation 211 -1(c).
389.
Id., Interpretation 211-1(d).
Id., Interpretation 211 -1(c).
390.
391.
Id., Interpretation 211 -1(i).
392.
A. B. A., Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Standards
and Rules of Procedurefor Approval of Law Schools 2006-2007 at 15, Standard 212
[hereinafter 2006-2007 ABA Standards].
Id., Standard 212(a).
393.
394. Id.
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enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum
of its parts"' 395 into something much stronger.
Two things made the new standards and interpretations especially noteworthy.
Before Grutter the ABA had not spoken in terms of anything that sounded like an
actual preference. The new approach changed that, expressly adding the observation
that it contemplated an "admissions process" within which "a law school may use
race and ethnicity... to promote equal opportunity and diversity. '396 The second
was to make it clear that the focus had shifted from process to results:
[tlhrough its admissions policies and practices, a law school shall take
concrete actions to enroll a diverse student body that promotes crosscultural understanding, helps break down racial and ethnic stereotypes,
and enables students to better understand persons of different races,
397
ethnic groups, and backgrounds.
The shift from "may" to "shall" in these provisions was clearly significant.
Under the previous standards a determination that a law school had met its
obligations was "based on the totality of its actions." 398 Post-Grutter,now styled as
a call for "Diversity and Inclusion,"399 that metric became "the totality of the law
school's actions and the results achieved." 400
In Fisher I the ABA characterized this as an approach that simply "urges law
schools... 'to enroll a diverse student body."'40 1 The reality is something different.
Results matter. Indeed, as I have previously argued, "the ABA does not appear to
treat the pursuit of diversity as optional." 402 The requirements imposed by Standard
206(a) apply even in the face of "a constitutional provision or statute that purports
to prohibit consideration of gender, race, ethnicity, or national origin in admissions
' 03
or employment decisions. 4
The significance of the ABA diversity mandate is magnified by a relatively new
requirement, Standard 302, which states that law schools must now adopt and pursue

395.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 315 (quoting Univ. of Michigan Law School Admissions
Policy).
396. Current ABA Standards, supra note 376, at 16, Interpretation 212-2 (emphasis
added).
397. Id. (emphasis added).
398.
2001-2002 ABA Standards, supra note 383, at 21, Interpretation 211-1.
399.
Current ABA Standards, supra note 376, at 12, Standard 206.
400. 2006-2007 ABA Standards, supra note 392, at 16, Interpretation 212-3
(emphasis added).
401.
Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 5, Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (quoting Interpretation 212-2).
402.
Killenbeck, supra note 43, at 41. This article focuses on a prior iteration of the
ABA Standards, within which the diversity provisions were designated as Standard
212(a) and Interpretation 212-1.
403.
Current ABA Standards, supra note 376, at 13, Interpretation 206-1 (emphasis
added). This provision refers to measures like Michigan's Proposal 2, which the Court
sustained in Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014).
The ABA will, presumably, revisit this question in the wake of that decision.
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This closely tracks Justice O'Connor's emphasis in
"Learning Outcomes."''
Grutteron the link between diversity and educational outcomes. Indeed, when read
in the light of Grutter,the diversity mandate in Standard 206 fits comfortably within
the outcomes requirement in Standard 302, which states that "[a] law school shall
outcomes designed to achieve [its educational and
establish and publish learning
40 5
professional] objectives."'
The curious thing about the current standards is the total lack of connection
between the outcomes the ABA specifies as essential in Standard 302 and Standard
206's focus on the supposedly essential educational and professional outcomes
associated with diversity. The interpretation fleshing out Standard 206 does tip its
hat toward those outcomes, stating that "the enrollment of a diverse student body
promotes cross-cultural understanding, helps break down racial, ethnic, and gender
stereotypes, and enables students to better understand persons of different
backgrounds.'' 6 But none of these objectives appear in Chapter 3 of the Standards,
which sets out the required elements of a "Program of Legal Education." In
particular, they do not form part of what the ABA describes as a "rigorous program
of legal education" designed to "prepare[] . .. students, upon graduation, for
ethical, and responsible participation as
admission to the bar and for effective,
4 7
members of the legal profession.'"'
Standard 302 requires each "law school [to] establish and publish learning
outcomes designed to achieve [its] objectives."''40 8 Those "outcomes ... shall, at a
minimum, include competency"''40 9 in four areas:
(a)Knowledge and understanding of substantive and procedural law;
(b)Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem-solving, and
written and oral communication in the legal context;
(c)Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients
and the legal system; and
(d)Other professional skills needed for competent and ethical
4 10
participation as a member of the legal profession.

Current ABA Standards, supra note 376, at 15. This standard was approved
404.
by the ABA in August, 2014 and will be applied as part of the accreditation process in
2016-2017. See A. B. A., Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
Transition to and Implementation of the New Standards and Rules of Procedurefor
2014,
Aug.
13,
Schools,
of
Law
Approval
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-education and-adm
issions_to_the bar/govemancedocuments/2014_augustjtransition and implementation
_of_new aba standards and rules.authcheckdam.pdf.
405.
Current ABA Standards, supra note 370, at 15, Standard 301(b).
Id. at 13, Interpretation 206-2.
406.
407. Id. at 15, Standard 30 1(a).
408. Id., Standard 30 1(b).
409. Id., Standard 302.
410. Id. at 15.
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Each of these is important. Each is, in pertinent respects, an aspect of the goal
articulated in Grutter, to "'better prepare students for an increasingly
diverse
41
workforce and society, and better prepare them as professionals.' '
But none of the educational outcomes the ABA actually expects laws schools to
pursue speak directly to either the values or outcomes associated with diversity. The
one possible exception is an option to include "cultural competency" as a possible
subset of "other professional skills."412 In a similar vein, the balance of Chapter 3
in the current Standards describes a curriculum within which neither the general
outline 413 nor any of the component parts of "a rigorous program of legal
education" 414 describe or require anything that remotely resembles the diversity
interests articulated in Grutteror Standard 206.4 11 Individual law schools are free
to "identify any additional learning outcomes pertinent to its program of legal
education.' '4 16 But the manner in which the ABA has approached the combination
of diversity and actual educational outcomes leaves the distinct impression that all
it really cares about is structural or numerical diversity.
The ABA approach stands in stark contrast to the one taken by the Liaison
Committee on Medical Education (LCME),'4 17 the accrediting body for the other set
of professional colleges and schools where selectivity and the need for affirmative
action is the rule. Medical schools also have a long-standing commitment to
"provide opportunities for obtaining a medical education to applicants of diverse
racial and ethnic backgrounds who are qualified to perform successfully as medical
students.""' 8 That is both necessary and appropriate, they believe, in the light of
"numerous studies [that] have demonstrated that minority physicians are more likely
than their non minority counterparts to serve minority populations.""' 9 It also
reflects "empirical studies indicat[ing] that minority patients express greater
reluctance to accept physician recommendations or seek medical care than their
white counterparts," but "[w]hen given the choice ...tend to choose, and be more
satisfied with, physicians of their own race or ethnic background.""2 °

411.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Brief of the American Educational Research
Association et al. at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
412. See Current ABA Standards, supra note 376, at 16 (noting that the "other
professional skills," Standard 302(d), as "determined by the [individual] law school...
may include.., cultural competency")(emphasis added).
413. See Current ABA Standards, supranote 370, at 16, Standard 303 (Curriculum).
414. Id. at 15, Standard 301(a).
415.
See generally id. at 17-20, Standards 304-307.
416. Id. at 16, Interpretation 302-2.
417. Like the ABA, the LCME is recognized by the Department of Education as the
accrediting body for medical schools located in the United States and Canada. See
http://www.lcme.org/about.htm. It is a joint undertaking of the American Medical
Association and the Association of American Medical Colleges.
418.
Brief of the Association of Medical Colleges Amicus Curiae at 2, Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
419.
Brief of the Association of American Medical Colleges et al. at 9, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter AAMC Fisher
I Brief].
420. Id. at 11. See generallyJordan J. Cohen, Statistics Don't Lie: Anti-Affirmative

20161

DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION

The current iteration of the LCME standards describes the need for "medical
education program [that] occurs in professional, respectful, and intellectually
stimulating academic and clinical environments, recognizes the benefits of diversity,
and promotes students' attainment of the competencies required of future
physicians."4 21 Each medical school is required to have "effective policies and
practices in place" for "ongoing, systematic, and focused recruitment and retention
activities' that will "achieve mission-appropriate diversity outcomes among its
students. ' 4 22 The net result is a system within which "diversity in medical and other
health professional school admissions is not itself an end goal, [but rather simply]
an essential mechanism for helping to produce a culturally aware workforce of future
423
health care professionals."
As part of this accreditation system, the LCME lists detailed educational
outcomes closely tied to the values associated with diversity. Its description of
expected "Curricular Content" emphasizes what it characterizes as "cultural
competence." Medical school faculty must "ensure that the medical curriculum
provides opportunities for medical students to learn to recognize and appropriately
address gender and cultural biases in themselves, in others, and in the health care
delivery process. ' 424 The curriculum, in turn, should include instruction regarding:
- The manner in which people of diverse cultures and belief systems
perceive health and illness and respond to various symptoms, diseases,
and treatments.
" The basic principles of culturally competent health care.
" The recognition and development of solutions for health care
disparities.
- The importance of meeting the health care needs of underserved
populations.

Action is Badfor Our Health, 78 ACAD. MED. 1084, 1084 (1997); Dean K. Whitla et al.,
Educationalbenefits of Diversity in Medical Schools: A Survey of Students, 78 ACAD.
MED. 460, 461 (2003) (arguing and noting research in support of the proposition that

"affirmative action in medical school admissions... expand[s] health care delivery to
traditionally underserved communities, generating social benefits that go beyond the

individual physician").
421.
See Liaison Committee on Medical Education, Functions and Structure of a
Medical School: Standardsfor Accreditation of Medical Education ProgramsLeading

to the M.D. Degree at 4, Standard 3 (March 2014, Effective July 1, 2015) [hereinafter
Current LCME Standards]. This is a new formulation, replacing one that required
"policies and practices to achieve appropriate diversity" and stated that medical schools
"must engage in ongoing, systematic, and focused efforts to attract and retain
students... from demographically diverse backgrounds." Liaison Committee on

Medical Education, Functions and Structure of a Medical School: Standards for
Accreditation ofMedical EducationalProgramsLeading to the M.D. Degree,at 4, (June
2008).

422.
Current LCME Standards, supra note 421, at 4, Standard 3.3. The primary
focus is on so-called "pipeline" programs "aimed at achieving diversity among qualified
applicants for medical school admission." Id.
423.
AAMC Fisher I Brief, supra note 419, at 18.
424.
Current LCME Standards, supra note 421, at 12, Standard 7.6.
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- The development of core professional attributes (e.g., altruism,
accountability) needed to provide effective care in a multidimensional,
diverse society.425
My point is not (necessarily) to praise the LCME and condemn the ABA. It is
rather to stress that it is possible to approach these matters in a way that emphasizes
the value of diversity and describes curriculum and educational outcomes within
which the elements associated with diversity are present. That combination is
essential in the light of what I believe Grutter requires if a given institution opts to
pursue diversity and, as part of that process, decides to employ a race-conscious
admissions process.
It is also critical given three realities. The first is that it is entirely up to each
institution whether it will engage in proactive diversity, by which I mean employ
preferences in the admissions process, which are almost certain to be race-conscious.
FisherI requires that there be "a reasoned, principled explanation for the academic
decision.., that a diverse student body would serve [a given institution's]
If there is, "Grutter calls for deference to [that]
educational goals." 426
conclusion. '4 27 This means that as long as the interest in diversity is recognized as
compelling for constitutional purposes, an individual college or university may - or
may not- opt to go down that path (law schools excepted given the ABA standards).
The problem for each institution is the second reality: the rigors of strict scrutiny
require that each individual institution that embraces diversity and employs such
preferences must be able to defend its own policy. It is one thing to benefit from the
deference afforded in making the initial decision to use preferences. It is quite
another to fashion an approach that can be defended, either as a matter of educational
policy or in a court of law. Both are important. Both require that the diversity
regime be keyed to educational outcomes, actively program for such outcomes, and
actively and continuously assesses whether and why outcome are (or are not)
occurring.
The third is that accreditation standards that direct attention to outcomes can and
should be more than a knee-jerk reaction to public calls for "accountability." In a
recent op-ed, for example, a dean asked whether "anyone [has] looked into whether
assessing student-learning outcomes over many years has made American colleges,
or students, better in some way? '428 The answer is yes, and that the "evidence
[demonstrates] a connection between changes in accreditation and the subsequent
improvement of programs, curricula, teaching, and learning in undergraduate
programs. '4 29 The focus in that study was on a new iteration of the accreditation
425.
426.
427.
428.

Id.
Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
Id.
Erik Gilbert, Does Assessment Make Colleges Better? Who Knows?, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 14, 2015, http://chronicle.com/article/DoesAssessment-Make-Colleges/23237 l/?cid-at&utm source=at&utmmedium=en.
429. J. Fredericks Volkwein et al., Measuring the Impact of Professional
Accreditation on Student Experiences and Learning Outcomes, 48 RES. HIGHER EDUC.
251, 277 (2006). One of the student outcomes in question was "[a]wareness of societal
and global issues that can affect (or be affected by) engineering decisions,", an area
especially pertinent in the context of diversity. Id. at 271.
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standards for "undergraduate engineering programs [that] shift[ed] the emphasis
from curricular specifications to student learning outcomes and accountability." 430
The study found that the revised standards were "indeed a catalyst for change" and
"provide[d] additional convincing evidence supporting the important role that
accreditation has played in engineering programs. ' 4 3' This suggests that the sorts
of changes being made by both the ABA and LCME can matter, and should be
treated as a welcome opportunity rather than an onerous obligation.
B.

Legal Education, Diversity, and Outcomes: Obligations Create
Opportunities

The ABA's approach to diversity reveals the dangers that arise when an
otherwise intelligent and well-meaning group assumes that a simple commitment to
"diversity and inclusion" is all that is required. Although the recent change in the
accreditation standards renders a great service by recognizing the importance of
diverse learning environments and the fundamental need for assessment, two
significant flaws emerge.
The first is the fact that the ABA does not expressly connect the dots between
learning outcomes associated with diversity and professional skills. For example,
will a racially diverse law school environment produce attorneys who are more
skilled at assessing the strength of a witness, finding facts, negotiation, structuring
settlements, and giving persuasive closing arguments? Will future prosecutors and
defense attorneys fully understand the role unconscious bias plays in day to day
events that give rise to criminal prosecutions? Will future legislators be better able
to create fair and impartial laws?
Each institution faces both the challenge and opportunity of crafting learning
outcomes tied to its unique institutional mission. However, it seems to me that the
ABA could acknowledge and set out more concrete learning outcomes tied to
substantive legal knowledge and key professional skills. Not only would the
standards garner more respect across a range of constituencies, but the articulation
of discrete knowledge and skills is the vital first step in any assessment plan.
Correcting this oversight in the accreditation scheme should be a fairly simple
process. The ABA recently announced that the Council for its Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar has asked its Standards Review Committee to
"review" three of the current Standards. 432 That process should be expanded to
include crafting a link between the diversity obligations imposed by Standard 206
and the educational outcomes contemplated within Standard 302.
The harder question is how to structure curriculum and courses in ways that
would achieve these goals. The materials I have discussed suggest that a

430. Id. at 254.
431.
Id. at 278.
432. A.B.A STANDARDS REVIEW COMMITrEE, 2015-16 Academic Year Agenda,
at
available
http://search.americanbar.org/search?q=standards+review+committee&client-default-f
rontend&proxystylesheet=default-frontend&site=defaultcollection&output=xml no
dtd&oe=UTF-8&ie=UTF-8&ud=l. The review will include Standard 206, but not
Standard 302.
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comprehensive educational plan should emphasize two particular programming
approaches: "interventions... designed to change the biases themselves," 433 and
"decision-making strategies 434
[that] prevent the unwanted biases from being activated
or influenc[ing] judgment.
Changing biases is admittedly not an easy task, particularly when the goal is to
change unconscious biases that operate outside our explicit awareness. 435 However,
as we proceed to develop interventions designed to reduce unconscious racial bias,
we can take comfort in the fact that research supports the notion that fundamental
cognitive change of this sort is attainable in law student populations. As indicated
earlier in this article, human development theory generally posits that "late
adolescence and early adulthood are the unique times when a sense of personal and
social identity is formed.4 36 A substantial body of the social science evidence
arguing for the value of diversity is accordingly predicated on the assumption that
"late adolescence is a time for the formulation of a person's adult identity, with "the
identity formation process... enhanced when young adults have the opportunity to
experiment with life within different and diverse environments.' 437 The pre-college
years remain important given the general consensus that undergraduate education
"increase[s] learning outcomes and depth of analysis" when young people are
38
exposed "to diverse ideas and novel situations."4
That said, these parameters apply equally well in the unique environment of a
law school. One of the central elements in contact and developmental theory is the
assumption that the benefits of diversity are associated with "discontinuity and
discrepancy," which "spur[s] cognitive growth. ' 4 39
Characterized as
"disequilibrium," the focus is on "transitions [which] are significant because they
present new situations about which individuals know little and in which they will
experience uncertainty. ' 440 Law school is traditionally described as having precisely
that purpose and effect.44 1 This means that while law students may well be adults
for traditional developmental theory purposes, the peculiar nature of legal education
provides opportunities "to experiment with new ideas, new relationships, and new
' 442
roles.

433.
Brian A. Nosek & Rachel G. Riskind, Policy Implications of Implicit Social
Cognition, 6 SoC. ISSUES & POL. REv. 113, 129 (2012) [hereinafter Nosek & Richmond].
434. Id.
435.
See supra, text accompanying notes 288, 290 (discussing initial assumptions
that implicit biases were "entrenched" and "likely to be very rigid").
436. Gurin Report, supra note 217, at 368.
437. Crosby & Smith, supra note 207, at 126.
438. Id.
439. Gurin, supra note 141, at 335.
440. Id.
441.
See Killenbeck, supra note 41, at 46 (discussing the idea that law schools can
have "a particularly strong socializing influence on their students" grounded in "the
extraordinary psychological impact" in can have on them).
442. Gurin, supra note 141, at 335.
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Further, our evolving understanding of brain growth and neuroplasticity suggests
that change in cognitive structures is possible even in the "mature adult, '443 a
characterization that describes the majority of law students. It also suggests that
skills and perspectives developed and acquired during law school have the capacity
to shape behavior and values over time, an important parameter given Grutter's
real benefits of diversity persisting into post-educational work
emphasis on the
444
environments.
With these points in mind, legal education may prove to be an especially apt
venue developing models for effective interventions. Law schools typically assert
an interest in justice and social responsibility. An appropriately "rigorous program
of legal education" 44 5 should then be about more than simple "[k]nowledge and
understanding of substantive and procedural law.' 4 6 It is, for example, one thing
to learn what is required to prove that an individual has committed the crime of
"distribu[ting] ...or posess[ing]" crack cocaine "with intent to... distribute or
dispense." 7 It is quite another to recognize how stark cultural differences between
individuals who routinely use crack versus powdered cocaine "can unjustly and
disproportionately penalize African American defendants for drug trafficking
comparable to that of white defendants. '" 8 In a similar vein, it is one thing to
profess allegiance to the general notion that "[o]ur constitution is color blind and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.' ' 9 It is quite another to
understand why a key element in the argument for affirmative action and diversity
may well be that "[in order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race."4 50 In each instance, the manner in which law schools approach teaching these
matters may prove to be at least as important as the fact that they are included in the
curriculum. As I noted when discussing the research and findings associated with
implicit bias and neuroscience, one very promising intervention involves the use of
counter-stereotypical exemplars. 451 In Constitutional Law, for example, the back
stories behind the development of many important substantive rules may be at least

443.

See supra text accompanying notes 339-41.

444.

See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.

445.
446.
447.
448.

Current ABA Standards, supra note 376, at 15, Standard 301 (a).
Id., Standard 302(a).
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Cracks in the System: Twenty Years ofthe
Unjust Federal Crack Cocaine Law (2006). The original sentencing disparity between

crack and powdered cocaine of 100 to I was reduced to 18 to I by the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). For a discussion of the politics
and bias informing the original regime, see Charles Ogletree et al., ColoringPunishment:
Implicit Social Cognition and CriminalJustice, in Implicit Bias Across the Law, 45, 50-

52. A recent study indicates that even with the 2010 reduction the combination of low
socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity continues to produce "disproportionate numbers
[of blacks] incarcerated for crack offenses." Joseph J. Palamar et al., Powder cocaine
and crack use in the United States: An examination of riskfor arrestand socioeconomic
disparitiesin use, 149 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 108, 114 (2015).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
449.

450.

concurring).
Bakke, 438 U.S. 407 (Blackmun, J.,

451.

See supra text accompanying notes 279-84.
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as important as the rules themselves. So, for example, identifying and focusing on
the contributions of individuals like Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
to the development of widely accepted constitutional
doctrines can help dispel
"stereotypic images of minorities and women. ' 452
A second possible intervention strategy involves the formation of links between
individuals 4and
others who were previously perceived as members of
"outgroups." 53 There are any number of courses in law school where collaboration
is an essential part of the instructional process. That will be especially the case in
"skills" courses, a subset of the curriculum that has become increasingly important
in recent years as law schools have been admonished to provide education and
training that has "real world" dimensions. By working closely in such classes with
individuals from different races and cultures, law students can achieve precisely the
sorts of "group formation and in-group regard" described in the implicit bias
literature. It is important, however, that this intervention establish contexts within
which students classify other students, including majority-minority students, as part
4 54
of their group.
Research supports a variation on this intervention where individuals of different
races become allies or team members. 45 5 The trials resulting in decreased implicit
bias among majority members placed white students in hypothetical scenarios that
"linked positively with Black people and negatively with White people. ' 45 6 As the
authors to the study note, "interventions that reduce relative preferences by
increasing negativity toward the more positively valued group may not be desirable
for application." 457 Indeed, this approach would be unethical in practice.
Law schools could, however, use videotaped simulation exercises where teams
of individuals traditionally assumed to be less than able are seen to be highly skilled,
well prepared, and successful. The images conveyed would be those associated with
successful attorneys: individuals who are articulate, discerning, and smart. In
particular, interactive simulations could allow student teams to participate in the
simulation as team members or allies with the group on the video. The students
would be familiar with the law and facts of the case. The end result is that the "team"
consisting of the video characters and on-site law students would be successful
against another team in the simulation who is less prepared and inspiring.
In addition to interventions designed to reduce implicit bias, the second
programming track focuses on strategies to constrain behavior.458 This track
acknowledges that implicit biases are difficult to change. Although altering
behavioral tendencies resulting from implicit biases is similarly complex, the
combined tracks are more likely to achieve positive outcomes.

452. Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 310, at 308.
453.
See Woodcock & Monteith, supra note 316, at 446 (noting that "positive
intergroup attitudes [are] fostered by linking the self to outgroups through common
ingroup membership").
454.

Id. at 447.

455.
456.
457.
458.

See, e.g., Lai, supra note 309, at 16.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Nosek & Riskind, supra note 433, at 129.
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Studies suggest that individual "motivation to respond without prejudice can be
effective at reducing discriminatory behavior. ' 459 Thus, successful strategies to
constrain behavior focus on educational programming to alert individuals to the
negative consequences and outcomes of unconscious bias. For example, a one-hour
interactive lecture that was part of college orientation and featured "experiential
illustrations of automaticity as well as group demonstrations of the I[mplicit]
A[ssociation] T[est]. ''46 ) Here, "participants' beliefs about bias and motivation to
address bias changed immediately following the presentation, and that change was
durable at a follow-up assessment two to four months later." 461 The law school
environment provides ample opportunities to provide students with this information
and, in turn, allows students to reflect on their own judgments within practice
scenarios. Through peer and faculty input students learn to intentionally conform
behavior to objective standards.
The examples above provide initial thoughts about research-based interventions
and strategies that may provide the link between diversity goals and outcomes.
Individual institutions, however, must consider strategies that fit within their overall
educational program and are targeted to produce the kind of learning outcomes
suggested by their unique institutional mission. It is worth recalling here Justice
Kennedy's admonition that judicial "acceptance of a university's considered
judgment that racial diversity among students can further its educational task" is
appropriate "when supported by empirical evidence." 462 Fortunately, the typical
hallmarks of legal education are actually conducive to developing this body of
evidence. For example, the crack cocaine and color-blind Constitution issues I noted
above are central elements in two courses that every law student takes: Criminal
Law and Constitutional Law. 4 63 Criminal Law is almost always a first year course,
while Constitutional Law may or may not be in the first year but is invariably
required. Both tend to be sectioned courses, meaning that they will be both large
and that students will be assigned to them. They will also, consistent with one of
legal education's central traditions, be graded on a "blind" basis, with the identity
(much less characteristics) of each student unknown as the professor teaching the
course reads their examinations and assigns a grade for the course.
This makes such courses ideal for precisely the sorts of pre- and post-enrollment
assessment that is central to developing sound assessments of both proposed and
actual educational outcomes. A law school willing to do so, for example, could
administer a survey at the beginning of the semester in which the course is taken that
provides a wealth of information about the background, characteristics, and
perspectives of the students enrolled. That would then be repeated at the end of the
course, allowing the institution (and the instructor) to identify key changes, both
positive and negative. The law school should also document the presence, or
459. Id.
460. Id. at 132. I discuss the IAT at text accompanying notes 304-331.
461.
Id.
462.
Grutter, 539 U.S. 388-89 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
463. These are two of the seven subjects that are part of the Multistate Bar
Examination, a 200 objective question examination that individuals must take in order to
pass the bar examination in every state except Louisiana. As "bar courses" they are
accordingly courses all students will take, whether required to do so or not.
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absence, of a number of diversity elements within the course. In this regard it is
important to keep in mind that it will be an advantage to have individual courses or
law school student cohorts with greater or lesser degrees of diversity, given that
meaningful studies must provide "comparisons... between students who
experience different types of education." 464 It is also important to probe with care
the composition of the classes and the outcomes in each, given the benefits that
follow when "both diversity and homogeneity can be compared."465
The pre- and post-experience surveys can also document a variety of personal
attitudes and educational outcomes associated with both education per se and
diversity in particular. There are a variety of instruments and survey techniques
already available that a law school can use. Individuals interested in these matters
' 67
' ' 66
have, for example, assessed "critical thinking skills, 4 "cognitive development, 4
support for or opposition to social change, 468 and "democratic citizenship." 469 The
core problem of implicit bias could in turn be revealed and measured by having
students to take one or more of the on-line IAT tests. 470 The time commitment is
minimal, often just ten or fifteen minutes per test. The results are immediate. And
the information conveyed is instructive and, almost certainly for most students,
compelling.
The social sciences resources are available. The only question is whether a given
law school is willing to undertake the work required to document what it is doing
and what it achieves. The obligations imposed on law schools by the accreditation
standards are arguably unique, coupling as they do simultaneous mandates to enroll
a diverse class and to document its educational outcomes. The opportunities they
have to do that are also unique and, if acted on, can do a long way toward answering
key questions in this important and contentious area.
CONCLUSION
I began this Article with the observation that arguably both the best and worst
result for diversity's champions is that the Court does not use Fisher11 to repudiate
the diversity rationale and simply refines the narrow tailoring inquiry. I also noted
the problems posed by what scholars characterize as "aversive racism," a
phenomenon that goes a long way toward explaining the disconnect between social
norms that stress general support for equality and recent episodes of race-motivated

464.
465.
466.
467.

Tuckman, supra note 122, at 235.
Apfelbaum, supra note 127, at 240.
See, e.g., Pascarella Critical Thinking, supra note 258.
Nicholas A. Bowman, College Diversity Experiences and Cognitive
Development: A Meta-Analysis, 80 REV. EDUC. RES. 4 (2010).
468. See, e.g., Gary D. Malaney & Joseph B. Berger, Assessing How Diversity
Affects Students' Interest in Social Change, 6 J. C. STUDENT RETENTION 443 (2005);
Biren (Ratnesh) A. Nagda et al., Learning about Difference, Learning with Others,
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violence. Americans in general "sympathize with victims of past injustice, support
71
principles of racial equality, and genuinely regard themselves as non-prejudiced."1
They are also human beings, individuals who regardless of race or ethnicity "possess
Blacks that are
conflicting, often non-conscious, negative feelings and beliefs about
' 472
rooted in basic psychological processes that promote racial bias.
The core assumption that animates the pursuit of diversity and the use of
admissions preferences is that they provide an essential path through which "all
members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions
that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America." 473 My
"good news - bad news" perspective about all of this is deeply influenced by my
recognition that the pursuit and implementation of principled diversity is a
complicated process that imposes substantial obligations on any institution that
undertakes it. It is also informed by my suspicion that few if any of this nation's
colleges and universities - and virtually none of its law schools - are engaged in
principled diversity.
The social science suggests that there may well be good reasons to promote
diversity. It also tells us that doing it right is a difficult process and that doing it
badly could be dangerous. We do not at this point know what the Court will do in
FisherIL Regardless, this nation's colleges and universities have an obligation to
act in educationally sound ways. If, as will almost inevitably be the case, a given
institution lauds and pursues diversity it has a concomitant to engage in the sorts of
programming and assessment I have described.
There are good reasons to debate diversity and affirmative action as matters of
social policy and constitutional law. Principled diversity is more than simple
numbers. Acceptance of diversity as a compelling interest and articulation of a legal
narrow tailoring rubric are necessary first steps. Conscious programming and
systematic assessment are their necessary companions. Indeed, they are essential
elements for any institution that is required to defend its particular approach in a
court of law. The fact that most institutions will not face that particular problem
does not excuse them from undertaking the work. Sound educational policy requires
every institution that embraces diversity must take care that what they do in the name
of diversity is truly principled.

471.
Adam R. Pearson et al., The Nature of Contemporary Prejudice:Insightsfrom
Aversive Racism, 10 Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 314, 316 (2009).

472.
473.

Id.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003).

